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Abstract
The U.S. Air Force seeks to measure and prioritize risk as part of its
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA) process. The goal of the CRRA is
to identify capability shortfalls, and the risks associated with those shortfalls, to
influence future systems acquisition. Many fields, including engineering, medicine
and finance, seek to model and measure risks. This research utilizes various risk
measurement approaches to propose appropriate risk measures for a military context.
Specifically, risk is modeled as a non-negative random variable of severity. Four
measures are examined: simple expectation, a risk-value measure, tail conditional
expectation, and distorted expectation.

Risk measures are subsequently used to

weight the objective function coefficients in a system acquisition knapsack problem.
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MEASURING THE RISK OF SHORTFALLS
IN AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES

I. Introduction
1.1. Issue Overview
In a continuing effort to prepare for future threats to United States security, the
U.S. Air Force has implemented a new analytic planning tool, the Capabilities
Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA). This process, a top-down analysis of Air
Force capability, is designed to guide service planning, requirements development and
system acquisition. The CRRA builds on six operational concepts to evaluate the
value of specific Air Force programs to war-fighting effects. According to the Air
Force Chief of Staff, the ultimate goal of the CRRA is “an operational, capabilitiesbased focus for acquisition program decision making” (Jumper, 2002).
There are six operational concepts that outline Air Force operations:
•

Global strike: gain and maintain access to the battle space

•

Space & C4ISR: integrate systems to provide information

•

Global response: attack high-value targets within hours

•

Homeland security: prevent, protect and respond to threats against U.S.
territory

•

Nuclear response: provide a deterrent and prepare to use

•

Global mobility: project, employ and sustain U.S. power around the globe

1-1

Based on these six concepts, the CRRA process identifies an exhaustive list of
desired Air Force capabilities known as the “master capabilities library”.

These

capabilities must be systematically reviewed to identify where the Air Force falls
short in its desired capability. Each capability shortfall can then be assessed for risk.
Figure 1 shows the five, iterative steps of the CRRA process. The steps involving risk
assessment are the focus of this thesis.
•
•
•
•

Define top level
capabilities
Refine scenarios

•
•
•

Strategic guidance
Expectations
•
•
•

Review risk assessment
Refine options
Make decisions

•
•

Identify capability shortfalls &
trade-space
Capability risk assessment
Develop options

Integrated risk
assessment
Integrated options

Figure 1. Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment Process

This research aims to provide a methodological basis for this risk assessment.
The Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection laid out an
appropriate goal for risk assessment that may also be relevant to the CRRA process.
For the quantification of risk the Air Force needs “methodologies, tools and
organizational processes” to handle “uncertainties in, or incomplete knowledge of,
threats, vulnerabilities, and protection measures; and for managing risks across
multiple components and organizations” (PCCIP, 1997:90). The overarching question
for this research, then, is how to prioritize risks when measuring Air Force capability
shortfalls?
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1.2. Background and Importance
Risk analysis is a diverse and growing field with a variety of opinions over its
appropriate focus. Broadly speaking, risk analysis breaks into two areas: physical risk
studied by engineers and the medical community, and financial risk in investment
management and the insurance industry. There is little overlap between those who
study risk measured in dollars and those who measure damage to equipment or loss of
human life.

Two authors, from the latter community, minimize insurance and

portfolio management as risk fields, arguing that “within the professional
communities on risk, most analysts would agree that damage to human health and the
environment are at the fore of what we call risk analysis and risk management”
(Klinke and Renn, 2002:1076). In addition, the study of risk has been largely separate
from the study of choice within the academic research (Sarin and Weber, 1993:135).
The concept of risk can have multiple characteristics or qualities. Investors
typically imply volatility when using the term risk (Survey of Risk, 2004:9).
Depending on the situation, risk may refer to the possible outcomes or consequences,
likelihood of occurrence of those outcomes, the significance, causes or affected
population (Ayyub, 2003:36).

The depth of risk assessment can vary greatly,

depending on the available information and the level of detail required. With little
data, qualitative risk assessment may be the only possible analysis. With more data
available, a quantitative approach can be taken (Bennett et al., 1996:468).
In an effort to provide structure to risk analyses in the public sector, the
National Research Council provides four questions for validation of a risk assessment
(National Research Council, 2000:5).
1-3

•

Are the generated measurements complete (collectively exhaustive) and useful
to decision makers?

•

Are all relevant uncertainties accounted for?

•

Are these uncertainties correctly specified?

•

Are stochastic and statistical techniques properly implemented?

These questions highlight the two most important components of risk: outcomes and
likelihood. The first of those components, the magnitude of the consequences, is a
physical measure of severity in dollars lost, equipment damaged or human lives
affected. The second is a mathematical construct, the probability that something goes
wrong (Haimes, 1998:41). A common mathematical evaluation of risk is the product
of these two factors, the likelihood of occurrence multiplied by the impact or severity
of the consequence (Ayyub, 2003:37).
The current CRRA approach to risk involves two independent assessments for
each identified capability. First, the process determines the current level of capability
based on a combination of assessments of proficiency and sufficiency.

The former is

the quality of existing Air Force capability and the latter is the quantity of the existing
capability. These two measures are combined to form a single measure of existing
capability, which ranges from none (0% capable) to complete (100% capable). Second,
Air Force subject matter experts are asked to identify the likely consequences if a
scenario occurs that requires the capability, and no capability exists. The estimated
severity assessment ranges from “minor” to “catastrophic”.

These independent

assessments of capability and expected severity are combined, using a contour plot to
determine a risk score as shown in Figure 2.
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100%

Capability Assessment

90%
80%

lower risk

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
higher risk

20%
10%
0%
minor

modest

substantial

major

extensive

catastrophic

Severity Assessment

Figure 2. Existing CRRA risk methodology

There are three major factors this approach to risk assessment does not consider.
First, the current level of a capability may have an effect on the outcome of a scenario.
A higher capability with a mitigating effect, for example, would reduce the resulting
severity. Second, the methodology does not allow for the possibility that a capability
will never be needed. If a perceived threat does not materialize, an adverse event may
never occur and no severity will be experienced, regardless of capability level.
Finally, the existing approach does not include the range of possible severities.
Estimating future severity involves both uncertain knowledge of threats and natural
variability. Without accounting for the affect of existing capability on risk, the
possibility that a capability will never be needed, and the variability in outcomes
capability shortfalls and redundancies may be incorrectly identified and prioritized.
This research proposes several ways that risk can be handled mathematically to
overcome these challenges.

Borrowing from engineering, finance and actuarial

science, this thesis models risk as a random variable with an associated probability
distribution, rather than a single number. This captures the notion that the future
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severity of outcomes cannot be known with certainty. This distribution can be
adjusted based on judgments of how changes in capability affect risk. Finally, using a
variety of tools this risk distribution can be measured, summarized into a single
number that allows risks to be ranked, prioritized or compared against each other.
1.3. Scope and Limitations
The primary goal of this research is to determine a methodology that will assist
Air Force decision makers to order or prioritize risks associated with shortfalls in
capabilities. Accurately ordering these risks will point senior Air Force leadership to
the areas that require the most focus of future system acquisition or tactics
development.

A secondary research goal is to explain approaches to risk from

different fields, providing military analysts with an expanded toolbox for modeling
and measuring risk. Quantifying and measuring the downside risk of capability
shortfalls requires projections of future needs and threats; this research suggests ways
to add mathematical rigor to that process. The final research goal is to determine an
appropriate risk measure and apply it to a system acquisition problem for the optimal
allocation of scarce resources.
There are several assumptions that form the foundation of this thesis. First,
while this research provides methodological recommendations to the CRRA, it uses
only notional numerical data and does not provide any programmatic recommendations. Second, the proposed methodologies add mathematical rigor to the risk
assessment portion of the CRRA, but still require subjective estimates of probabilities
and severities of future events. Third, this thesis considers only downside risk. All
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outcomes of capability shortfalls are assumed to be undesirable severities. Upside or
positive risk—the possibility that capability exceeds need—is not considered.
Using the proposed methodology, risks can be assessed at any level of the
CRRA hierarchy of operational concepts, desired effects, general capabilities and
specific tasks. Risk modeling at a higher level probably means a less complicated
result, but may mean additional analytic challenges. Risk modeling lower in the
hierarchy means a more complicated final product, but may be easier to assess.
This research focuses on the assessment of the risk associated with previously
identified and quantified capability shortfalls. It does not propose ways to quantify
the current level of a capability or consider whether all capabilities have been
correctly specified, emphasizing instead the prioritizing of risks associated with
shortfalls already identified.
A general risk analysis process suggested by Haimes involves five distinct steps.
First, risk identification involves specifying all the imaginable things that could go
wrong, particularly noting possible failures in hardware, software, organization or
humans. Second, risk quantification and measurement requires objective or subjective
assessment of the likelihood that the identified events will occur, including
interactive and causal relationships. Third, risk evaluation develops alternate courses
of action with associated costs or tradeoffs. Fourth, risk acceptance and avoidance
means choosing between alternatives.

Finally, risk management implements the

decision and provides feedback (Haimes, 1998:55-56).
This research focuses on the second and fourth steps in risk analysis:
quantification, measurement and evaluation.
1-7

An overall methodology for the

prioritization of Air Force capability shortfall risks involves four steps, shown in
Figure 3. The first step, identifying capability level, the capabilities review portion of
the CRRA process, takes place outside the scope of this research.

Quantifying

likelihood and severity of adverse effects forms the second step. This may involve an
objective or subjective approach or some combination of the two.

Presumably

intelligence will play a role in estimates of the likelihood of undesirable events and
the severity of the consequences. The identified level of friendly force capability
should be considered in these quantitative estimates; a higher level of capability may
make an event less likely to occur (prevention) or lessen the severity of the outcome
(mitigation).
The third step of risk prioritization involves taking the distribution identified in
step two and translating it into an appropriate measure or measures of risk. The
measure may use the expected or average severity, the variance or dispersion of the
amount of severity or other relevant mathematical quantities.

This measure, a

number rather than a probability distribution, can then be ordered with other
measures in step four.
Inputs

Capabilities Review

Identify capability
level

•
•

Intelligence
Capability?

•
•

Quantify
likelihood and
severity

Avg severity
Variation

Calculate
measure of risk

Figure 3. Capability Shortfall Risk Assessment
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•
•

Dominance
Preferences

Order measures
of risk

1.4. Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis describes methodologies for the mathematical
modeling and measurement of risk in the risk assessment phase of the Capabilities
Review and Risk Assessment process.

Chapter II provides an overview of the

academic literature, including a discussion of the causes and remedies for uncertainty,
and an explanation of a variety of risk analysis techniques that may be useful in the
assessment risk in a military context. Chapter III explains the factors involved in
modeling capability shortfall risk and offers four mathematical risk measures for
summarizing risks in a single quantity. Chapter IV examines a set of notional risks
based on nine high-level capabilities and shows how risk measures can be used to
guide system acquisition decisions. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the results of this
research and suggests questions for future study.

1-9

II. Literature Review

2.1. Overview of Risk Analysis
Risk analysis plays a prominent role in a number of disciplines, including
engineering, decision analysis, statistics, medicine, financial management and
actuarial science. While the exact approaches applied to risk vary, some common
themes emerge. In general, risk includes some aspect of uncertainty and some aspect
of negative consequences.

The first goal of risk analysis is to understand—and

perhaps reduce—the uncertainty.

The second is to understand—and perhaps

prevent—the negative outcomes.
There is some disagreement in the academic literature over both aspects of risk.
Some analysts claim that a deterministic situation, one with complete certainty,
cannot be considered risky. The past, for example, has no risk because all of its
uncertainties have been resolved, and risk can only belong to the future
(Ayyub, 2003:35). Others describe any situation with a downside or negative outcome
as a risk, even if that negative outcome is certain (Fishburn, 1984:397). The Defense
Department defines risk as the “probability and severity of loss linked to hazards”
(Department of Defense, 2003:459).
While risk commonly implies negative outcomes, some analysts also use the
term risk to include positive outcomes as well. This is particularly true in the
financial management field, where an investment can have a positive or negative
return (Jia and Dyer, 1996:1692). In other contexts, risk is only used to describe
negative outcomes and does not refer to success (Ayyub, 2003:35). The Capabilities
2-1

Review and Risk Assessment process focuses on the negative side of risk only and has
defined risk as “the impact on combat operations if … capability is not available to
provide the required effects” (AFSAA, 2003:35). The CRRA definition of risk does
not include any reference to probability, but does not explicitly exclude probability
either.
For this research, risk will be considered to include any situation with negative
consequences, with an emphasis—but not a restriction—on the uncertainty associated
with those consequences.
Risk analysts break the process of studying risk into two phases: risk assessment
and risk management. Risk assessment seeks to gain an understanding of the factors,
outcomes and parameters of the search for answers to three questions
(Haimes, 1998:55).
•

What can go wrong?

•

What is the likelihood of it going wrong?

•

What are the consequences?

Risk management seeks to reduce or control risk. Like risk assessment, it has three
broad questions (Haimes, 1998:55).
•

What options are available?

•

What are the costs and benefits?

•

What is the future impact?

2.2. Uncertainty
This section describes the causes of uncertainty and some existing approaches to
describe uncertainty in verbal and mathematical terms.
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Risk, though related to

uncertainty, is not quite the same thing. Where uncertainty can include any absence
of knowledge, risk is more an “educated gamble” (Survey of Risk, 2004:4).
2.2.1. Causes of Uncertainty
Uncertainty can occur for an array of reasons. This section describes some of
these reasons, and explains the distinction between uncertainty caused by a lack of
knowledge and uncertainty due to natural variability.

It then includes a brief

overview of game theory, a mathematical approach for understanding uncertainty
caused by intelligent opposition.
2.2.1.1. Categorizing Uncertainty
Historically, the term “uncertainty” was used to describe situations for which
probability distributions could not be used because of insufficient data. The National
Research Council no longer finds this an acceptable definition in the analysis of risk,
favoring uncertainty as a more general word to describe any situation in which
outcomes are not fully known (National Research Council, 2000:41).
Uncertainty can take many forms, but in general it can be broken into three
broad categories: natural variability, knowledge uncertainty and decision model
uncertainty (National Research Council, 2000:48). Natural variability (also called
aleatory, external, objective, random or stochastic uncertainty) refers to the inherent
instability in the physical and human world, the understanding that the same process
will not play out the same way every time.

Knowledge uncertainty (also called

epistemic, functional, internal or subjective uncertainty) refers to the imprecision of
our understanding of a system (National Research Council, 2000:42).
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Knowledge uncertainty affects calculations in a different way from natural
variability (National Research Council, 2000:6).

For example, soliciting expert

opinion may measure variability but still leaves uncertainty (Kelly and
Taylor, 2003:495).

Uncertainty about data contributes to knowledge uncertainty.

Data uncertainty comes from measurement or transcription errors, sampling that is
not representative of the entire population, or a system that is inconsistent or
heterogeneous in time or space (National Research Council, 2000:44).
The final category of uncertainty is the decision model. The decision maker
may have poorly defined or continuously changing objectives or values which prevent
consistent decisions (National Research Council, 2000:42).

When the model is

uncertain, even complete knowledge and zero natural variability are insufficient for
correct insight into the system in question.
2.2.1.2. Uncertainty from an Intelligent Opponent
In a traditional analysis of reliability, engineers assume negative effects follow
some probability distribution based solely on the design specifications of the system.
Building a more robust system, with stronger parts or redundant components,
improves reliability, the probability that the system will continue to function through
some time period. In a military context, where damage may occur because of enemy
attack instead of random accident, new analyses are necessary. Game theory, which
requires decisions against an intelligent opponent, can help to bridge the gap between
classical probability theory and a world that faces threats from enemies intent on
destruction.
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When a threat is natural, the analyst can build a probability distribution of risk
on the design of the system in question. When a threat comes from an intelligent
source such as an enemy military, however, the probability distribution associated
with risk can change over time.
Non-state enemies, such as terrorists, add additional complexity.

In some

sense, terrorists threaten in illogical and unpredictable ways, because no obvious
procedure exists to test for the appropriate safety factor (Smith, 2002:40). However,
the management of risk requires the same kinds of tradeoff between cost and
productivity whether the system faces an intelligent threat or a random one
(Smith, 2002:41).
Two papers from the journal Military Operations Research describe ways to
incorporate a game theoretic model into a risk analysis of military systems. In a 2002
paper, “Risk Management and the Value of Information in a Defense Computer
System,” Hamill et al. provide a model of threats and protections to an information
system. Paté-Cornell and Guikema (2002), in “Probabilistic Modeling of Terrorist
Threats: A Systems Analysis to Setting Priorities Among Countermeasures,” explain
how to separate beliefs from actual capabilities in a model and how to handle learning
by both terrorists and those defending against them.
Hamill et al. (2002) define risk assessment as the linkage among three factors:
threat, vulnerability and impact. Natural or accidental human threats can be modeled
with a classical probability approach. That leaves threats that are not accidental, but
intended attacks (Hamill et al., 2002:64). These intentional human threats can be
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modeled with a game-theoretic method to account for possibility that the threat can
change—in a rational manner—depending on the defenses set up.
Two approaches allow the defender to identify the payouts and probabilities in
the game. The Red Team “hacker approach” to vulnerability assessment involves
putting together a team that attempts to break the system. This is equivalent to
playing the game multiple times to see if equilibrium can be reached. The advantage
of this approach is that it most closely models reality, with actual human decision
makers seeking their optimal strategy (Hamill et al., 2002:65). At each iteration the
damage to the system (whether sensitive information acquired by the attacker or data
destroyed) can be measured, along with the ease or speed with which the attacker
gained access. These attacks can be paired with the defensive measures employed to
build the two strategy vectors and associated payoff matrix for insight into the risk of
damage to the system.
An alternative approach to vulnerability assessment is the “algorithmic
approach,” which is a “methodical and systematic evaluation” of the system. The
advantage of the algorithmic approach is that it may identify threats that the
unsystematic hacker approach does not happen to explore (Hamill et al., 2002:65).
This is equivalent to attempting to completely identify strategies and payoffs and
solve the game theoretically.

In practice, a combination of both hacker and

algorithmic approaches will generally lead to the greatest understanding of the game
parameters.
In another application of game theory to risk analysis, the Paté-Cornell article
focuses on building an “overarching model,” focused on model structure rather than
2-6

numbers, to collect information from different sources on threats, potential enemies,
possible damage and targets. The game theory aspect of terrorism and counterterrorism comes from its dynamic nature as each side updates priorities with the other
side’s changes (Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002:5-7).
One of the greatest difficulties in analyzing risk in a game theory setting is the
sheer number of possibilities.

The places and ways an enemy can attack are

enormous. When combined with the number of ways to deter or mitigate damage,
the problem—at least at the strategic level—is unmanageable. The authors propose a
model that attempts to cut through some of the problems with size by combining
possible outcomes. They suggest that every event or severity random variable (risk)
in their model can be analyzed at a more detailed level if desired (Paté-Cornell and
Guikema, 2002:5).
As with Hamill’s approach, Paté-Cornell assumes that the model of enemy
strategy requires separate assessments of capability and motive. When modeling
multiple enemies (for example, different terrorist groups), each enemy may have a
different combination of these two factors (Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002:7). This
does not necessarily mean that n-person game solution methodologies are required,
however. Because the defender is not (presumably) forming coalitions with some
terrorist groups against others, these are a set of two-person games rather than a
single n-person one. Either all attackers can be lumped together as a single opponent,
accounting for any synergies the various attackers gain from each other, or defending
against each opponent can be considered a separate game.
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Clearly, the actual employment of game theory in the assessment of risk is
difficult. The number of strategies available to a potential attacker is immense, and
the number of strategies to deter or mitigate risk is also large.
2.2.2. Quantification of Uncertainty
In understanding and modeling risk, uncertainty must be translated into
probability.

In well-defined, well-understood situations, probabilities can be

determined directly. For example, it is clear and widely-understood that a fair coin
has probability 0.5 of landing heads and probability 0.5 of landing tails. In other, less
intuitive situations, probabilities can be estimated based on empirical data. When
historical data is available for risks, objective probabilities can be estimated.
Typically, however, sparse historical databases lead away from objective probabilities
in risk assessment to subjective probabilities based on expert judgment
(Haimes, 1998:138).

This section describes approaches and methods to determine

these subjective probability estimates.
In the context of risk, there can be uncertainty in both outcomes and
probabilities of those outcomes. Decision makers may find it helpful to break their
problem into four classes: probabilities and outcomes known, probabilities uncertain
and outcomes known, probabilities known and outcomes uncertain, or both
probabilities and outcomes uncertain. (Langewisch and Choobineh, 1996:140)
A linear mathematical program involves an objective function to maximize or
minimize subject to a set of linear constraints defining a set of feasible solutions. In
the standard form of this model all parameters must be known. Eum, Park and Kim
(2001) provide a set of linear programming tools to handle simultaneous uncertainty
2-8

about weighting and value scoring in a multi-criteria decision analysis. The authors
suggest several conditions, besides exact estimates, that can be used to define
weighting and value scoring (Eum et al., 2001:399). Based on whether weighting,
value scoring or both weights and values are uncertain, the authors show how a linear
programming model can identify dominated and potentially optimal alternatives
(Eum et al., 2001:405). This tool could be used for prioritizing risks when relatively
little is known about the likelihood of various outcomes.
It is possible to distinguish between decision making “under partial information” and the sensitivity of a decision. The former involves imprecisely specified
weights. The latter includes exact weights but a decision maker uncertain about
which factors are important and interested in refining those original “exact”
estimates.

Even if a decision is robust in its parameters, sensitivity analysis is

invaluable in helping the decision maker understand the problem (Rios Insua and
French, 1991:177).

Some other authors suggest a Bayesian approach to handle

uncertain parameters. However, when parameters are considered as random variables
with probability distributions, there may be more imprecision from the new
distributions than additional benefit to the model.

An iterative process of the

decision maker making judgments and the analyst performing sensitivity analysis
may be a more appropriate approach (Rios Insua and French, 1991:180).
Choobineh and Behrens (1992) caution against assuming too much about the
underlying probability distribution of a random variable. One alternative to fitting a
theoretical probability distribution is to use an interval distribution. An interval
distribution makes no assumption about the probabilities of any outcome other than
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to place upper and lower bounds. An alternative to the interval distribution is a
possibility distribution. Possibility distributions essentially take multiple intervals,
rather than a single interval, to allow for a gradual decrease in possibility (Choobineh
and Behrens, 1992:910). Figure 4 shows an interval distribution, where a parameter is
equally likely to take on any value within the range, and a possibility distribution,
where the parameter has the same expected value as the interval distribution, but is
less likely to take on values at the extremes.
Possibility distribution

Possibility

Interval distribution

Parameter Value

Figure 4. Interval and Possibility Distribution (Choobineh and Behrens, 1992:910)

A final approach to the quantification of uncertainty is the translation of
subjective, verbal expressions of likelihood into numerical probabilities. There is
large disagreement over what is meant by, for example, an infrequently occurring
event. For any verbal to numeric translation, the only consistency is that “unlikely”
means less than 0.5 probability and “likely” means greater than 0.5. The context of
the verbal description has a large effect on the numerical translations. In a situation
in which negative consequences occur very infrequently, a high probability may still
be much closer to zero than to one.
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Table 1 shows three verbal-numeric translation schemes. In the first, sixteen
risk managers were surveyed for their interpretation of different phrases describing
likelihood (Jablonowski, 1994:52). The average response of the sixteen individuals is
shown, along with the range of their responses. The ranges overlap, except for the
gap between “somewhat likely” and “likely”.
The second set of verbal-numeric translations comes from an engineering
setting, with a failure rate describing the occurrence of system failure per cycle or per
unit of time (Ayyub, 2003:61).

Because system failure is a rare event, these

probabilities are much closer to 0 than to 1, with “high” occurrence, for example,
equivalent to probabilities of 0.025 to 0.05.
The third set of translations comes from a military regulation (MIL-STD1629A, 1980:section 3.1). These translations are also intended for engineers, but are
expressed independent of time, as simply the probability of system failure.

Table 1. Verbal to Numeric Probability Translations
Description
Average Range
Rare
.05
.01-.15
Very unlikely
.10
.03-.25
Unlikely
.19
.09-.30
Somewhat unlikely
.26
.09-.45
Likely
.77
.52-.98
Frequent
.78
.60-.90
Extremely likely
.93
.85-.99

Occurrence
Failure Rate
Minor
<1 in 1,000,000
Low
1 in 20,000 to 1 in 4000
Moderate
1 in 1000 to 1 in 80
High
1 in 40 to 1 in 20
Extreme
1 in 8 to 1 in 2

Description
Extremely unlikely
Remote
Occasional
Probably
Frequent

Prob of Failure
0.001
0.001-0.01
0.01-0.10
0.10-0.20
>0.20

2.2.3. Probability Distribution Tails
Sparse data in the extreme values of a probability distribution can make fitting a
correct distribution a difficult task. In some cases having a small amount of data can
be particularly dangerous since it results in too confidently fitting a distribution that
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does not accurately represent the true distribution. Even when a distribution is fit
using a significant amount of data it should be subjected to sensitivity analysis of its
parameters (Bratley et al., 1987:125).
When a lack of data in the tail of a distribution does not allow a theoretical
distribution to be fit, an exponential tail is a reasonable approximation. This can be
adjusted in sensitivity analysis with various Weibull distributions (Bratley
et al., 1987:133).
Alternatively, the distribution tail can be fit using the statistics of extremes,
which is the mathematical study of the largest (or smallest) values a random variable
can assume.

The statistics of extremes identifies three forms of probability

distribution tails, depending on the type of data.

A Gumbel distribution, with

cumulative distribution function H(x) = exp(-e-x), allows tails in both the positive and
negative domains. The exponential, lognormal and normal distributions all fall into
the Gumbel family. A Weibull form only works when the domain of the random
variable is negative and has cumulative distribution function of the form
H(x) = exp[−(−x)γ]. Uniform and triangular distributions follow this Weibull form.
The final tail distribution is the Frechet approximation with cumulative distribution
function H(x) = exp(−x-γ). The Frechet form can only be used when the domain is
positive. The Pareto distribution is an example of a distribution that falls in the
Frechet family (Lambert et al., 1994:734).
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2.3. Existing Approaches to Risk Modeling
A great deal of the risk analysis literature deals with specific techniques for risk
assessment and mitigation in mechanical or biological systems.

Some of the

approaches are more general, however, and may be useful in a military context. This
section overviews these risk approaches, providing a basic definition of the technique,
the context in which it has been used, the inputs required to implement as well as the
outputs generated, and some of the advantages and disadvantages relative to other
tools.
2.3.1. Engineering Approaches to Risk
Engineering risk analysis focuses broadly on breaking complex systems into
more easily understood parts. The most general of these approaches is reliability
assessment.

Other tools or techniques used by engineers to assess risk include

hierarchical holographic modeling, which emphasizes the different perspectives
experts bring to an analysis, the partitioned multiobjective risk method, which
simplifies a risk distribution into multiple risk measures, and impact intensity, which
multiplies different risk factors into a single number.
2.3.1.1. Reliability Assessment
In the engineering community, reliability is a major field of risk analysis. The
study of reliability involves the analysis of complex systems to identify their chance
of failure over time. In general, reliability analysis focuses on breaking a system into
smaller components which are more easily understood.
Several concepts are available to express system reliability quantitatively.
Reliability itself is generally modeled as a function of time. The function value is the
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probability a system continues to work, under specified conditions, for a specified
period of time (Ebeling, 1997:5). This function, the complement to a cumulative
distribution function, is called the survival function denoted by S(t).
Reliability is often expressed as the mean time to failure (MTTF) or mean time
between failures (MTBF), numbers which are calculated as the average of the
survival function. For instance, the mean time to failure is
MTTF =

∫

∞

0

S (t )dt .

(1)

Other reliability measures include maintainability, where systems are analyzed
for both their time to failure and the subsequent time for repair, and availability, the
proportion of time a system is working in the long run (Ebeling, 1997:6).
Several tools are available to help an engineer identify and quantify the possible
failure of a complex system. Preliminary hazards analysis is a first step in reliability
assessment.

This is a non-mathematical approach to identify the elements of a

system or events in a process where something could go wrong (Henley and
Kumamoto, 1981:21). A more detailed, systematic approach is failure mode and effect
analysis (FMEA).

This is an iterative, bottom-up process to identify the ways

(modes) a system can fail, explaining the causes and quantifying the probabilities of
occurrence (Ebeling, 1997:167).

FMEA is widely-used and well-accepted in the

engineering community. The primary disadvantage of this approach is its tendency
to ignore combinations of problems that together lead to failure, even though
independently they are not dangerous (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981:40).
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Fault tree analysis is a graphical view of the ways and causes of system failure.
Figure 5 shows an example fault tree. Where FMEA starts at the lowest possible
component level of a system to analyze reliability, fault tree analysis is a top-down
approach that focuses on events rather than system components. The top event in the
tree is the event of the overall failure of the system. The tree then breaks down this
overall failure into all the possible resultant events that cause the overall failure. A
series of logical AND and OR “gates” are used to show when all resultant events are
required for a top event or if a single resultant event is sufficient. At the bottom level
of the tree are “basic events” which are not analyzed in further detail. When these
basic events have probabilities attached to them, the overall system failure probability
can be calculated.

Figure 5. Fault Tree

The advantage of a fault tree approach is its flexibility in level of detail.
Component or system failures may be decomposed into extremely precise, detailed
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events, or kept at a simple level. Unfortunately, this means that fault trees can grow
large and complex very quickly. Because they do not (necessarily) visually match the
system or process, even individuals familiar with the system may have difficulty
following them (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981:40).
Criticality analysis is a quantitative tool to prioritize system components based
on their relative importance to the overall system. After a failure mode and effect
analysis has identified all of the ways (modes) a system can fail, a criticality index
number can be calculated for each component as the product of three factors: the
conditional probability of damage given a particular failure mode occurs, the rate of
occurrence of the particular failure mode and the time period being analyzed.
Summing over all failure modes affecting the component in question results in an
index number for ranking component criticality (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981:34;
Ebeling, 1997:170).
2.3.1.2. Hierarchical Holographic Modeling
Hierarchical holographic modeling is a tool to identify risks in large-scale,
complex systems. The goal of the method is to take advantage of multiple expert
views of the system in order to provide different perspectives on the vulnerabilities
and hazards in the system. The approach requires examining the overall system from
different, overlapping perspectives: time, economics, geographical, legal, and
environmental, for example (Haimes, 1998:98). Hierarchical holographic modeling
has been used to identify risks in energy utilities, water resource systems, sustainable
development projects and system acquisition (Haimes, 1998:99-108).
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To identify risks, a hierarchical structure of factors based on the different
perspectives under consideration must be built. Experts can then provide subjective
input at the different levels of the hierarchy where they have expertise. Sparse
historical databases lead away from objective probabilities in risk assessment to
subjective probabilities based on expert judgment (Haimes, 1998:138). The primary
advantage of this modeling technique is that it allows expert opinions to overlap; the
elements of the hierarchy do not have to be mutually exclusive (Haimes, 1998:95).
2.3.1.3. Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method
The partitioned multiobjective risk method (PMRM) splits the risk distribution
into two or more sections and calculates the conditional expectation, given that
severity falls with each of these sections. In addition, the overall expected severity is
calculated. This results in at least three numbers, which serve as measures of the risk.
The method is used for multiobjective risk analysis problems, and each of the
conditional expectations, plus the overall expectation, are used as quantities in a
multiobjective decision framework (Haimes, 1998:312).
Partitioning is a subjective exercise and there is no general rule for selecting the
points at which to split.

Partitioning can be done on the severity axis or the

probability axis. That is, the n partitions can be defined by severities βi such that 0 <
β1 ≤ β2 ≤ … ≤ βn-1 ≤ ∞. Alternatively, the n partitions can be defined by probabilities
αi such that 0 < α1 ≤ α2 ≤ … ≤ αn-1 ≤ 1 (Haimes, 1998:315).
PMRM requires the entire risk distribution to be known, but takes advantage of
that knowledge by calculating measures over the entire distribution. By calculating
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multiple measures, the method retains information lost in other techniques that do
more simplification. The disadvantage of this is that multiple measures do not allow
risks to be easily ranked.
2.3.1.4. Impact Intensity
The basic concept of impact intensity is to identify a number of risk factors
such as likelihood of occurrence, expected severity, chance of detection or expense of
mitigation, and assign an index value to each of these factors. This models risk as an
n-dimensional vector. An “impact intensity” or “risk prioritization number” can then
be calculated in several ways using the values in this vector.
The first formulation is the linear multi-attribute value function where each
factor receives a score between 0 (low risk) and 1 (high risk) and a relative weight
(Cho et al., 1997:26).
n

Impact Intensity =

∑ weight value
i

i =1

i

(2)

Alternatively, impact intensity can be calculated as a multiplicative function that
results in a maximum score when any single factor is at its maximum, similar to the
calculation of reliability in a parallel components system (Cho et al., 1997:27).
n

Impact Intensity = 1 − ∏ (1 − valuei )

weighti

(3)

i =1

A simpler impact intensity function involves multiplying the factor scores together, a
calculation like the system reliability of components in series (Ayyub, 2003:62).
n

Impact Intensity =

∏ value

i

i =1
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(4)

Table 2 shows an example of the three impact intensity functions with four risk
factors scored at low (0.0), medium (0.5) and high (1.0) and all factors are equally
weighted. Under Equation (3) when any factor scores a one, the impact intensity is
one. With Equation (4), when any factor scores a zero, the impact intensity is zero.

Table 2. Example of Impact Intensities
Factor Scores
(0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0)
(0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5)
(0.0, 0.0, 0.5, 0.5)
(0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
(0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0)
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
(0.0, 0.0, 0.5, 1.0)
(0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 1.0)
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1.0)
(0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0)
(0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.0)
(0.5, 0.5, 1.0, 1.0)
(0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0)
(0.5, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0)
(1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Eq (2)
0.00
0.25
0.35
0.43
0.50
0.50
0.56
0.61
0.66
0.71
0.75
0.79
0.87
0.90
1.00

Eq (3)
0.00
0.50
0.75
0.88
1.00
0.94
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Eq (4)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.50
1.00

Impact intensity offers the advantage of summarizing risk in a single number,
but allowing components of that risk to be easily highlighted.

A risk can be

considered critical if it has a high overall score or if any single component score is
above some threshold. Risks with impact intensities are easily ranked, because the
technique reduces the complexity of multi-dimensional risk to a single number.
The method does not, however, allow or account for any variability. All scores
are deterministic. Depending on the equation selected to calculate intensity, the
result might inappropriately focus on a risk with a high single component score that is
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not really dangerous overall, or ignore a truly important risk with moderate
component scores that combine to a low score overall.
2.3.1.5. Farmer Curve
The Farmer curve is a graphical tool to display tradeoffs in risk and indicate risk
acceptance. Risk acceptance is an acknowledgement of the existence of the possibility
of adverse effects and a willingness to live with the situation. It was originally
employed to explain the risk of radioactive release from nuclear power plants (Henley
and Kumamoto, 1981:13).
The curve, shown in Figure 6, plots frequency versus severity. The curve is the
maximum acceptable level of risk. Scenarios that are more likely or more severe than
the curve are deemed unacceptable risks. That is, points above or to the right of the
curve are unacceptable. Points below or left of the curve, representing less likely or
less severe scenarios, are classified as acceptable risks and do not require mitigating
resources.

frequency

unacceptable risk

acceptable risk

severity

Figure 6. Farmer Curve
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2.3.1.6. Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle comes out of the field of toxicology and essentially
states that no level of risk is acceptable. If there is any chance that a substance will
cause damage to human beings or the environment, efforts should be taken to
completely eliminate its release (Klinke and Renn, 2002:1071).
Because no risk is deemed acceptable under the precautionary principle, only
two factors need to be considered: the most catastrophic possible outcome and the cost
of risk management. Decision makers should seek the biggest bang for the buck in
risk mitigation. Two principles used in practice are “as low as reasonable” and “best
available control technology” (Klinke and Renn, 2002:1071).
The precautionary principle has an advantage of simplicity, since it does not
require detailed assessment of possible outcomes or likelihoods attached to particular
severities. Unfortunately, it is often unrealistic to completely eliminate risk and
ignoring the probability distribution associated with various outcomes may result in a
poor allocation of resources.
2.3.2. Decision Analysis Tools
Decision analysis is concerned with selection between multiple competing
alternatives. Multiple criteria, as well as multiple alternatives may be part of the
problem. In a risk assessment situation, the different risks can be considered the
alternatives, and the decision tools could help in the ranking or prioritization of these
risks.
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2.3.2.1. Non-Parametric Decision Rules
When probabilities are completely inestimable, Fleischer suggests that five
different decision rules are available to rank alternatives. Although these rules do not
require quantification of likelihood, there still must be analysis of all possible
alternatives and outcomes. Each of these rules will not necessarily give the same
answer, but they will help frame the decision (Fleischer, 1984:292).
The minimax rule is the extreme pessimistic approach that assumes the worst
possible outcome will happen. Among all alternatives, select the one with the best
(minimum) of the worst (maximum) possible costs. If the problem is concerned with
gains rather than losses, the equivalent rule is maximin, that is, selection of the
alternative with the best (maximum) of the worst (minimum) possible profit
(Fleischer, 1984:286).
The minimin rule is the opposite approach to minimax, taking instead an extreme
optimistic approach that assumes the best possible outcome will happen. Among all
alternatives, select the one with the best (minimum) of the best (minimum) possible
costs.

Again, if the problem is measured in gains instead of losses, the rule is

maximax,

selection

of

the

alternative

with

the

highest

possible

profit

(Fleischer, 1984:287).
The Hurwicz rule takes a middle ground between extreme optimism and
extreme pessimism. This rule, named after econometrician Leonid Hurwicz, involves
a linear combination of the best and worst possible outcomes for each alternative.
Multiply the worst possible outcome by the “index of optimism,” a number α
between 0 and 1, and multiply the best possible outcome by (1 – α). The sum of these
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two numbers can be compared across alternatives.

If α=0, the Hurwicz rule is

equivalent to minimax and if α=1 it is equivalent to minimin (Fleischer, 1984:288).
The Laplace rule, named after mathematician Pierre Simon de Laplace, assumes
that all outcomes are equally likely. The rule says to calculate the expected value of
these equally likely outcomes, and select the alternative with the best expected value
(Fleischer, 1984:288).
The Savage rule, also known as the principle of minimax regret, seeks to minimize
the difference between the actual outcome and the outcome if the future had been
correctly forecasted. This difference is the decision maker’s “regret.” In order to
apply the Savage rule, named after statistician L.J. Savage, calculate a regret matrix,
where each row is a different alternative and each column is a different “state of
nature.” Each entry in the matrix is the difference between the outcome of that
combination of alternative and state and the best possible outcome in that state of
nature. Select the alternative with the smallest maximum regret value. The most
significant disadvantage of the Savage rule is that adding an additional alternative can
shift the answer, even if the new alternative is not preferred (Fleischer, 1984:291).
2.3.2.2. Lexicographic Method
The lexicographic method is a technique to rank different alternatives under
multiple criteria. In the context of risk, criteria could be the worst possible outcome,
a chance of any adverse event occurring or the most likely outcome. The decision
maker first ranks all of the attributes from most important to least important. Each
alternative is then scored for the most important attribute. Alternatives that meet
some acceptability threshold according to the most important attribute are then
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scored for the next most important attribute. This process continues until only one
alternative remains, or the alternatives have been scored for every attribute and a set
of possible solutions remains (Chankong and Haimes, 1983:200).
The primary advantage of this approach is its cognitive simplicity. It does not
require that every alternative be scored for every criterion and it does not require a
precise score for each alternative, only a decision on whether the acceptability
threshold has been met. In addition, the lexicographic method closely relates to the
way individuals make decisions in practice, focusing on the single most important
attribute to screen alternatives rather than examining all alternatives with all
attributes simultaneously (Chankong and Haimes, 1983:200).

The primary

disadvantage of the lexicographic method is its emphasis on ranking the attributes.
An alternative that scores low in the single most important attribute but is superior in
every other category may be eliminated even though it is important (Chankong and
Haimes, 1983:205).
2.3.2.3. ELECTRE Method
The ELECTRE method is a tool for multiobjective decisions where the number
of alternatives is relatively small and the value of each alternative is known with
certainty. According to Chankong and Haimes, the method was first proposed by
Bernard Roy in 1968. The method can result in a preferred alternative, or a preferred
class of alternatives. To implement the technique each alternative is compared to the
others and assigned an “outranking” relation, specifying that one alternative is
preferred to another.

These relationships can be displayed in a directed graph

(Chankong and Haimes, 1983:205-6).
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ELECTRE does not require that every set of alternatives be comparable, though
every comparison and outranking relation adds strength to the assessment (Chankong
and Haimes, 1983:208). The primary disadvantage of the ELECTRE method is its
requirement of certainty in outcomes.
2.3.3. Risk Measurement
The purpose of quantifying risk and simplifying that quantification in a risk
measure is to order different risks and, ultimately, to choose between them. The
quantification requires the probability distributions of the risk and the risk measure
requires

a

preference

function

for

those

distributions

(Landsman

and

Sherris, 2001:103). Increasing risk can mean one of two things: that bad outcomes are
becoming more likely or that likely outcomes are getting worse (Fishburn, 1984:397).
Risk measurement seeks to combine both of these aspects into a single number.
2.3.3.1. Need for Risk Measures
In the simplest case one risk stochastically dominates another and specific
probability distributions of risks need not be known in order to rank risks. Under the
risk-return dominance property, a gamble with a higher (expected) value and a lower
risk will always be preferred (Sarin and Weber, 1993:136).
The simplest measure of risk (to understand) is the expected severity. There is
significant danger of conflating events with high probability of occurrence and low
cost with events of low probability of occurrence and high cost through simple
expected value comparisons because the catastrophic outcomes that could occur may
be too high to bear no matter how small the probability (Haimes, 1998:17).
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2.3.3.2. Properties of Risk Measures
Several authors identify a list of properties or attributes that should be
considered when selecting a risk measure. Sarin and Weber argue that a risk measure
should increase when the range or variance of severity increases, when a constant is
added to all severity outcomes, when outcomes are multiplied by a constant greater
than 1 or when a gamble is repeated multiple times (Sarin and Weber, 1993:138).
Landsman and Sherris proposes four properties of risk measures: risk aversion,
diversification, additivity and consistency. The risk aversion property means that a
risk measure will be greater than or equal to the expected value.

Under risk-

neutrality the risk measure is the expectation. The diversification property means
that multiple small risks should be preferred to a single large risk. The additive
property means that a risk measure of the sum of risks is equal to the sum of risk
measures. Finally, consistency applies to risks with positive and negative outcomes
and implies that if one risk (of loss) is preferred to another, equivalent gains should
have the same preference ordering (Landsman and Sherris, 2001:105).
In a 1999 paper regularly cited in the literature, Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and
Heath, outline four desirable characteristics of a risk measure. When a risk measure
meets these four axioms, it is considered a “coherent” risk measure (Artzner
et al., 1999:210).
The first property of coherence is translation invariance, which means that any
constant added to a risk changes the risk measure by a corresponding amount
(Artzner et al., 1999:209). Expectation, for example, has translation invariance since
for any random variable X and constant α.
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E[X + α] = E[X] + α.

(5)

Variance, on the other hand, does not have the translation invariance property since

Var[X + α] = Var[X].

(6)

Any risk measure then that includes variance, or a function of variance like standard
deviation, cannot be a coherent risk measure. Figure 7 shows the probability density
functions of two risks, identical except for a constant shifting one to the right. Under
translation invariance the shifted risk should have a higher risk measure.

Original Risk + constant

likelihood

Original Risk

severity

Figure 7. Translation Invariance Axiom Illustration

The second property is subadditivity, which means that the measure of any two
risks together must be less than or equal to the sum of the measures of the two risks.
This property ensures that a single large, unacceptable risk cannot be separated into
two smaller, acceptable ones (Artzner et al., 1999:209). The potential problem with
this property is that it does not allow for the possibility that putting two acceptable
risks together may create a situation with unacceptably large risk.
Figure 8 shows the probability density functions of two independent risks, X
and Y, and a third, Z = X + Y, which is the sum of the first two. Under subadditivity,
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the risk measure of Z must be at least as large as the sum of the risk measures of X
and Y.

X

likelihood

Y

Z=X+Y

severity

Figure 8. Subadditivity Axiom Illustration

The third coherence property is positive homogeneity, which states that if a risk is
multiplied by a positive constant, its risk measure must also be multiplied by the
positive constant.

This property guarantees that the measure of risk increases

proportionally to the risk.
Figure 9 shows the probability density functions of a single risk, X, and two
other risks, Y = 2X, and Z = 3X. Under positive homogeneity, the risk measure of the
Y must be exactly twice the risk measure of X and the risk measure of Z must be
exactly three times the risk measure X.
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X

Y = 2X

Z = 3X

severity

Figure 9. Positive Homogeneity Axiom Illustration

The final coherence axiom is monotonicity, which states that larger severities
should result in larger risk measures.

Under monotonicity, then, a larger risk

measure implies a riskier situation (Artzner et al., 1999:210). This axiom implies that
if one risk stochastically dominates another risk, it will have a larger risk measure.
2.3.4. Finance and Actuarial Science Approaches to Risk
A second broad area of risk modeling comes from financial management and
actuarial science.

These fields have the advantage of dealing with dollars, so

severities tend to be more easily quantifiable. In finance, the general approach to riskmodeling is risk-value theory.

Actuarial science uses two different models, the

individual model which sums policy claims in a single time period and the collective
model which traces claims over multiple time periods.
2.3.4.1. Risk-Value Modeling
In every application of risk, risk modeling attempts to capture two characteristics of the system in question. First, there is an aspect of variation. The less certainty
in the outcome of a situation, the more risky it is considered. Second, there is an
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aspect of “badness” in which more severe outcomes are more risky than less severe
ones (Sarin and Weber, 1993:139). Trading off these two aspects against each other is
the basic premise of risk-value modeling.
In risk-value modeling risks are considered gambles, with each risk a random
variable that can have both positive and negative outcomes. In a financial application
where the risk is associated with the final wealth of some investment, the literature
proposes variance as one possible measure of risk. This measure explicitly ignores
expectation, with risk measured purely on the spread of the outcomes. The problem
with variance as a sole measure of risk is that an investment with an increasing
variance in the direction of increasing wealth will intuitively be less risky (Mitchell
and Gelles, 2002:109).
The first significant work in risk-value was done by Markowitz in the 1950s.
He proposed “semi-variance” as a measure of risk. Semi-variance is the variance of
the risk random variable in the downside or worst outcome tail (Markowitz, 1959:189).
Generally the expected value is used to define the start of the tail, but any arbitrary
point can be used (Estrada, 2003:10). The semi-variance of a risk X (where larger
values correspond with worse outcomes) with probability density function f(x) and
expected value µ is calculated as

E[min(X-µ,0)2] =

∞

∫µ (x − µ ) f (x )dx .
2

(7)

“Downside standard deviation” can be calculated by taking the square root of
Equation (7) (Estrada, 2003:10).
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Alternatively, variance can be combined with expected return in a linear
combination (Sarin and Weber, 1993:137). This allows for the intuitively pleasing
property that “mean preserving spreads” or lower expected returns correspond to
higher risk. A mean preserving spread is a change in a random variable that has no
effect on the expectation, but increases the variance (Mitchell and Gelles, 2002:110).
The linear combination measure, as a tradeoff between the expectation and the
variation, allows for the fact that an improvement in expected value may result in a
willingness to accept more uncertainty.
Some authors propose going beyond expectation and variance to use higher
order moments of the risk distribution in order to measure risk (Sarin and
Weber, 1993:138). While these measures, such as E[Xθ] where θ is a parameter to be
varied by the decision maker, add complexity to the analysis, it is not clear what
additional insight they provide into the riskiness of a situation.
Another risk measurement from finance is the risk premium, the difference
between the expected payoff and the amount an individual is willing to accept with
certainty.

Calculation of the risk premium requires knowledge of not only the

distribution of the outcomes of the gamble, but also the utility associated with
different outcomes (Sarin and Weber, 1993:139).
Recent work in risk-value theory goes beyond distribution moments to
incorporate utility theory.

This allows risk judgment and preferences to be

incorporated into the modeling of risk (Sarin and Weber, 1993:135). Using utility in a
risk-value model accounts for two different factors that may influence individual
ordering of risks. First, individual preferences may result in different individuals
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ranking identical risks in different ways. Second, the number of times that a risk will
be experienced affects uncertainty. In one formulation of risk-value using utility, the
“standard risk”, X’, is the original risk random variable adjusted so that the expected
value is 0, that is, X’=X-E[X]. The utility that the decision maker attaches to this new
random variable is a measure of risk independent of expected return (Jia and
Dyer, 1996:1692).
2.3.4.2. Value at Risk
Similar in name but not otherwise related to risk-value modeling, value at risk
is the most common shorthand description of risk in financial applications. Value at
risk focuses on risks over time and is an estimate of the maximum amount of loss
possible for a given investment (Sarma et al., 2003:339).
techniques are used to calculate value at risk.

Various forecasting

The “delta-gamma” model, for

example, can be used when risks in an investment portfolio are quadratic and
normally distributed (Castellacci and Siclari, 2003:530). Another approach uses the
“autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic” (ARCH) model (Cabelo Semper and
Clemente, 2003:516). Regardless of the particular forecasting method used, once an
estimate of the value at risk has been calculated, a likelihood is attached to this figure
(Cabelo Semper and Clemente, 2003:517).
2.3.4.3. Individual Actuarial Model
The individual risk model considers each insurance policy as a unique random
variable. In a specified time period, some of the policies will have no claims and the
others that do have claims will vary in size according to some probability distribution.
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The total dollar amount of claims is a random variable C = X1 + X2 + X3 + … where Xi
are independent random variables of the claim sizes of different insurance policies
(including the possibility of no claim). Time is not included in the model (Kaas et
al., 2001:28).
The model requires two different inputs. First, the probability that each policy
will have a claim in the time period in question must be known.
distribution of the size of claims must be known.

Second, the

With these two inputs, the

distribution of C can be calculated using convolution or numerical approximation
techniques (Kaas et al., 2001:20).
The individual actuarial model intuitively matches the real world, since the
claim size of each policy is represented as its own random variable. It has the
disadvantage of only considering one time period. The assumption of independence
between the different policies can be inappropriate when, for example, a fire in an
apartment building results in multiple claims from several different policies (Kaas
et al., 2001:28).
2.3.4.4. Collective Actuarial Model
An alternative actuarial approach is the collective risk model, in which an
insurance portfolio is viewed as a stochastic process. In this model claims occur at
random time intervals and the size of each claim follows some probability
distribution. The total dollar amount of claims, C(t), is a function of the number of
claims through time t, N(t), and the size of each claim.

C(t) = X1 + X2 + X3 + … + XN(t)
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(8)

where the Xis are independent, identically distributed random variables of claim size
over time. The number of claims over a time interval is often modeled according to a
Poisson or negative binomial distribution (Kaas et al., 2001:45).
Implementation of the collective model requires the frequency with which
claims are filed and the distribution of claim sizes.

The model assumption of

independence between the number of claims and the size of each claim may conflict
with reality, where a single catastrophic event can result in a large number of claims
of large size, but in practice the collective model seems to work well (Kaas
et al., 2001:46).
The canonical risk model in actuarial science assumes that insurance claims
arrive according to a Poisson process and that claim sizes are independent and
identically distributed.

The resulting stochastic process is modeled as a surplus

process, U(t), representing the wealth of the insurer at time t, given by
N (t )

U (t ) = u + pt − ∑ Yi .

(9)

i =1

The initial wealth of the insurer is represented by u. Premium payments arrive at a
constant rate, p, and the claims, Yi, follow some general distribution with mean size,

β. The number of claims in time t, N(t), is a Poisson random variable with rate λt.
“Ruin” occurs when the total claims paid-to-date, C(t), is greater than the sum of
initial wealth and premiums paid-to-date.
process (Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:71).
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Figure 10 shows an example surplus

U(t)

ruin

time

Figure 10. Surplus Process

“Ruin probability,” ψ, is the chance that ruin ever occurs. Ruin probability is a
measure of the credit risk of the firm or the riskiness of some portfolio of policies.
The stability condition for the surplus process is p > λβ, which implies that, in the
long run, premium payments exceed claims (Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:71).
The probability of ruin in the canonical risk model is determined by four
factors: the arrival rate of claims, the rate at which premiums are paid, the initial
wealth of the firm, and the distribution of claim size. Ruin probability increases with
a higher claim rate, lower premium rate, lower initial wealth or larger claim sizes.
Except in rare cases, ruin probability cannot be solved analytically and must be
simulated. When claim size is exponentially distributed, however, ruin probability
can be calculated directly according to the following formula:

ψ=

λβ

⎡⎛ λβ
⎞u⎤
− 1⎟ ⎥
exp ⎢⎜
c
⎠β⎦
⎣⎝ c

(10)

For all distributions of claim size, an upper bound on the probability of ruin can be
calculated if the moment generating function of the claim size distribution exists.
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Lundberg’s upper bound of ruin probability, ψ < e-Ru, is a function of the initial wealth
and the adjustment coefficient, R, which is the unique solution to the equation

λ + cR = λMY(R)

(11)

where MY(·) is the moment generating function of the claim size distribution
(Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:71).
When claim sizes do not follow an exponential distribution, ruin probability
cannot be directly calculated. Because ruin is a rare event in many cases, direct
simulation can be highly inefficient. The surplus process can be simulated over a
long period of time without ruin ever occurring, even though the actual probability of
ruin is greater than zero. This means that there is no natural stopping condition for a
simulation.

There are several techniques available to handle this problem and

estimate the probability of ruin. Importance sampling uses a change in probability to
measure to make ruin certain. The process can then be simulated until ruin occurs,
and ruin probability calculated based on the simulated time (Vázquez-Abad and
LeQuoc, 2001:72). The storage process technique (also known as the buffer content)
measures the amount of time the process spends above some level of wealth. Finally,
the convolution formula technique uses the sequence of losses in the process, where
each loss is defined as a new low in the value of the process (Vázquez-Abad and
LeQuoc, 2001:73).
Calculating ruin probability for the collective actuarial model might apply in a
military context to risk in weapons inventory or troop levels. Inventories slowly
building over time and depleting quickly in wartime may possibly be modeled with a
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surplus process. The probability of ruin is the probability that the inventory stock
empties completely or falls below some critical threshold level.
2.4. Summary of Risk Literature
Because risk appears in many academic disciplines, the approaches vary
significantly. While much of the literature focuses on the specifics of gathering
empirical data or taking actions to mitigate risk in a particular field, some techniques
are general to many kinds of risk.

This chapter has summarized issues and

techniques in the more mathematical approaches to risk.
Although a situation with a deterministic negative outcome can be considered a
risk, in most cases risk implies uncertainty about future events. This uncertainty can
come from insufficient knowledge, natural variability or vagueness in model
specification.

When uncertainty comes from an intelligent opponent, a game-

theoretic framework may be helpful in understanding the relevant factors. When
parameters are uncertain, interval or possibility distributions may be useful for
modeling.
Risk in engineering applications, known as reliability analysis, focuses on
breaking possible failures into their component parts. After risk has been quantified,
tools like the Farmer curve and precautionary principle can point decision makers to
the mitigating actions necessary to reduce or eliminate risk.
Generic decision analysis techniques may be relevant to the study of risk as
well.

Ranking tools like non-parametric decision rules and the ELECTRE and

lexicographic methodologies allow the analyst to use limited information about risks
to order or prioritize them.
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The most mathematically oriented risk approaches come from the financial
management and actuarial science fields. Risk-value models use moments of the
probability distribution of risks to create single-number risk measures. Actuarial
science employs two models of risk, the individual and collective models, to combine
multiple risks into a single portfolio.
Table 3 provides a summary of all of the approaches explained in this chapter.

Table 3. Summary of Academic Approaches to Risk
Approach
Individual actuarial
model

Features
Application Advantages/Disadvantages
total risk as sum of separate
insurance simple concept; requires good
independent risks; ignores time
estimate of CDF, especially tail;
requires convolution or numerical
methods
Collective actuarial total risk as a sum of claims
insurance computationally efficient; requires
model
over time; claims often Poisson
distribution of number of claims and
distributed
size of each claim
Non-parametric
select best possible outcome,
many
does not require probability
decision tools
least worst outcome or
applications distributions; different rules can give
variation of these
different result; requires all
alternatives to be identified
ELECTRE method sequential elimination; series
many
requires certainty
of pairwise comparisons
applications does not require completeness or
that each pair of alternatives are
comparable
Farmer curve
plot of frequency versus
nuclear
simple in concept but difficult to
severity with line indicating
radiation determine where to draw curve
acceptability threshold
release levels
Reliability
bottom-up approach breaks
engineering generally easier to estimate
system into components or
systems probabilities at component level;
identifies all possible failure
analysis quickly becomes very large
causes (FMEA, criticality
analysis, fault tree analysis)
partitioned multibreaks severity axis into pieces
flooding complex
objective risk method and calculates conditional
expected values
Hierarchical
layered multiple models
water supply draws from expertise in
holographic modeling examining system from
management, technology, law, etc.;
different perspectives
more useful for identifying than
quantifying risks
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Reference
Kaas et al.
19
Kaas et al.
46
Fleisher 292

Chankong
207
Henley 13
Henley 40

Haimes
Haimes
working
paper 15

Approach
Impact intensity

Risk-value theory

Features
measures component level
(cost, schedule, technical, etc)
potential negative impact and
then system impact using
additive or multiplicative
function
measures of risk based on
expected value and variance

Application Advantages/Disadvantages
Reference
engineering flags a risk when only one aspect of Cho et al. 25,
acquisition many is a problem; relies on
Ayyub 61
subjective probability estimates

finance

MCDA linear
programming

measure of risk (number) easier to
understand and rank than a
distribution; hard to determine the
best measure for a particular
application
allows for uncertainty in both value
scoring and weighting; number of
required LP problems can grow
quickly

takes ranking or other
general
conditions specifying weighting
and value scoring and converts
to linear program to identify
dominated or potentially
optimal alternatives
Lexicographic method sequential elimination; ranks
general
simple implementation, requires only
alternatives one criterion at a
ordinal scoring
time, starting with most
important
Precautionary
assume worst case scenario environmental no probability estimates necessary;
principle
protection requires identification of worst
possible outcome
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Sarin and
Weber 137

Eum et al.
397

Chankong
200
Klinke and
Renn 1071

III. Methodology

3.1. Methodology Overview
There are two key steps in the prioritization of risks. First, the proposed
methodology models each risk as a random variable with an associated probability
distribution. For risks associated with shortfalls in Air Force capabilities, each of
these risks can be conditioned on existing capability, with adjustments based on the
prevention and mitigation effect of any capability change. The second step in risk
prioritization is the development of an appropriate risk measure that translates each
distribution into a single quantity.
3.2. Modeling Risk
This thesis borrows from the actuarial science definition of risk as a nonnegative random variable of severity (Kaas et al., 2001:223). This differs from the
CRRA definition by its inclusion of likelihood. Each shortfall in capability has an
associated risk, a chance that undesirable consequences will occur. This methodology
expands the actuarial definition by making a subtle distinction between severity and
risk.

Conceptually, severity refers to any possible undesirable outcome.

A

distribution of severity describes the likelihood of occurrence of any of these
outcomes. Risk includes the distribution of severity, but also includes the possibility
that no severity will occur. When the occurrence of an adverse event is certain, then,
risk and severity are equivalent concepts. When some probability exists, however,
that an adverse event will not occur, the distribution of risk and distribution of
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severity are different. The following sections describe a method for mathematically
constructing these severity and risk distributions.
3.2.1. Visualizing Risks
Graphically, severity can be shown with a probability density function (for
continuous risks) or probability mass function (for discrete risks). A density function
shows the likelihood of taking on any severity level. Figure 11 shows three example
severity density functions. A probability density function for a risk could have a

likelihood

point mass at zero to account for the probability of no adverse event occurrence.

severity

Figure 11. Example Probability Densities of Severity

Alternatively, severity and risk may be visualized by a distribution function.
This function, describing the probability that severity will be greater than some value,
is known as the complementary cumulative distribution function, the decumulative
distribution function or the survival function. This thesis will use the term severity
distribution function and the notation S(x), or the term risk distribution function and
the notation R(x) for these functions describing the probability that severity exceeds
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the value x. Figure 12 shows example severity distribution functions. Note that for
any severity distribution function, the probability that severity is greater than zero is

Prob(Severity>x)

unity. This does not have to be true for a risk distribution function.

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
severity

Figure 12. Example Severity Distributions

3.2.2. Modeling Severity
The CRRA team has specified severity using eight risk factors, reflecting the
fact that negative consequences in a military context come in several forms. The
eight risk factors are achievement of objectives, friendly casualties, friendly capability,
friendly infrastructure, collateral damage, enemy escalation/weapons of mass destruction,
U.S. national integrity, and U.S. government function. Each of these risk factors has
verbal descriptions identifying the level of risk with one of six severity categories.
Severity categories range from minor to catastrophic (AFSAA, 2003:19-20). Table 4
shows the severity descriptions for the friendly casualties factor. The descriptions and
severity categories of all eight factors are provided in Appendix A.
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Table 4. Severity Categories and Descriptions for Friendly Casualties
Minor
Few citizens/troops
killed/ injured. Citizens
overseas threatened.

Modest
Tens of citizens/troops
killed/ injured. Citizens
overseas attacked/
injured.

Substantial
Hundreds of
citizens/troops killed/
injured. Citizens
overseas attacked/
taken hostage.

Major
Hundreds to thousands
of citizens/troops killed/
injured. Citizens
overseas killed/ taken
hostage.

Extensive
Thousands to tens of
thousands of
citizens/troops killed/
injured. Citizens
overseas killed/ taken
hostage.

Catastrophic
Hundreds of thousands
of citizens/troops killed/
injured. Many citizens
overseas killed/ taken
hostage.

In order to mathematically model risk, these qualitative categories of severity
must be translated into numerical values.

An index linking each category to a

number explicitly states not just that some outcomes are worse than others, but by
how much they are worse. This changes the existing ordinal ranking into a ratio scale,
with zero equivalent to no severity.
Under the existing quantification system of the categories, all categorical step
increases in severity are equal, with minor indexed to one, modest to two, up to
catastrophic indexed to six (AFSAA, 2003:37). With this index, a shift from minor
severity to modest severity is equivalent in magnitude of change to an increase from
major severity to extensive severity. Multiplying each of the values by 100 and
dividing by 6 results in the normalized index (rounded to the nearest tenth) in Table
5, with zero equivalent to no adverse event and one hundred equivalent to catastrophe.
This index implies that, for example, seven minor events are worse than a single
catastrophic event because 7 times 16.5 is greater than 100.
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Table 5. Linear and Discrete Severity Index
Category
minor
modest
substantial
major
extensive
catastrophic

Severity Index
16.7
33.3
50.0
66.7
83.3
100.0

This discrete index leaves unclear, for example, whether severity 40 would be
classified as modest or substantial. To avoid these gaps in the index, we can employ
intervals as shown in Table 6 (Choobineh and Behrens, 1992:909). Unlike the discrete
index, the range zero to one hundred is divided into five equal intervals. This index
does not restrict catastrophic severity, which can grow infinitely large as any value
greater than one hundred.

The interval severity index allows translations from

category to number or from number to category. The linear trend still holds, since,
for example, a step from the worst minor severity to the worst modest severity is the
same as a step from the “best” substantial severity to the “best” major severity.

Table 6. Linear Interval Severity Index
Category
minor
modest
substantial
major
extensive
catastrophic

Severity Index
0 < x ≤ 20
20 < x ≤ 40
40 < x ≤ 60
60 < x ≤ 80
80 < x ≤ 100
x > 100

Categorical step increases in severity do not have to be equal. If a step in
categorical severity grows multiplicatively, for example, a multiplicative index must
be used. Table 7 shows indices where an increase of one category implies a doubling,
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tripling or ten times the severity. To calculate these indices start with the top
value, 100, and divide by the appropriate multiplicative factor. Continue dividing
until all five sub-catastrophic categories are specified.

Table 7. Logarithmic Interval Severity Indices
Category
minor
modest
substantial
major
extensive
catastrophic

Log2 Severity
Index
0 < x ≤ 6.3
6.3 < x ≤ 13
13 < x ≤ 25
25 < x ≤ 50
50 < x ≤ 100
x > 100

Log3 Severity
Index
0 < x ≤ 1.2
1.2 < x ≤ 3.7
3.7 < x ≤ 11
11 < x ≤ 33
33 < x ≤ 100
x > 100

Log10 Severity
Index
0 < x ≤ .01
.01 < x ≤ .10
.10 < x ≤ 1.0
1.0 < x ≤ 10
10 < x ≤ 100
x > 100

Regardless of the precise index used to convert categorical severity ratings to
numerical scores, care must be taken to correctly express the true relationships. It is
possible to mix indices with some steps increasing by half, others doubling or tripling.
However, if a major severity event is considered equivalent to five modest events, for
example, the lower limit of the major score must be five times the lower limit of the
modest score and the upper limit of the major score must be five times the upper limit
of the modest score.
3.2.3. Eliciting Probabilities
After severity has been appropriately quantified, a probability distribution of
severity can be estimated by eliciting probabilities from subject matter experts. A
number of existing parametric probability distributions may be appropriate.
Actuarial science most often uses the exponential, Weibull and Pareto distributions to
model the size of insurance claims (Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:78). Each of
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these three distributions generally follows a form in which less severe outcomes are
more likely than more severe ones, which may make these distributions appropriate
for modeling severity outcomes in a military context.
The great advantage of the exponential distribution is its simplicity. If severity
is exponentially distributed, only one number must be elicited from the decision
maker (or other subject matter experts) in order to determine the value of the single
parameter, λ. There are two possible approaches. First, the decision maker may
provide the average or mean severity, in which case λ = 1 / (mean severity)
(Wackerly et al., 2002:178).

Alternatively, the decision maker may provide the

probability that severity exceeds some value, x. The λ parameter follows directly as

λ = – ln(P{Severity>x}) / x

(12)

S(x) ≡ P{Severity>x} = e-λx.

(13)

where

If severity cannot be assumed to be exponentially distributed, other parameters
must be elicited. One alternative is to specify a discrete distribution for the first five
severity levels and use an exponential distribution for the catastrophic severity tail
(Bratley et al., 1987:125). An example of such a distribution is shown in Figure 13.
This distribution specifies a probability of minor severity, a probability of modest
severity, and so forth. The sum of the probabilities of severities less than catastrophic
is subtracted from one, and this result is used in Equation (12) to determine the
exponential tail of catastrophic outcomes.

3-7

likelihood
minor

modest

substantial

major

extensive

catastrophic

Figure 13. Probability Mass Function with Continuous Tail

Alternatively, the decision maker may provide the probability that severity is
greater than some (or all) of the severity categories and a continuous probability
distribution may be fitted to the data as shown in Figure 14. (See Section 4.4 for an

Prob(Severity>x)

example of how to fit a Weibull distribution given three exceedance probabilities.)

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
minor

modest

substantial

major

extensive

catastrophic

severity

Figure 14. Fitted Continuous Distribution

To move from a distribution of severity to a distribution of risk, subject matter
experts must provide one additional input, the probability that an adverse event
occurs, that is, the probability that severity is greater than zero. The risk distribution
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function, R(x), then, is the severity distribution function, S(x), multiplied by this
probability of occurrence, (1-p).
3.2.4. Conditioning on Capability
Severity and risk distributions may not be fixed over time. As Air Force
capabilities change, the probability of adverse event occurrence may increase or
decrease, or the shape of the severity distribution may change in some way. In
general, a change in capability can have two effects. First, it can prevent, reducing the
probability that any adverse event will occur. This is an effect on the risk distribution
and not on the severity distribution. Second, it can mitigate, reducing the severity of
the effects of an adverse event. This is an effect on the severity distribution. The
academic literature does not always distinguish between these two effects, preferring
the term “mitigation” to refer to both a reduction in probability of occurrence and
resulting severity (Ayyub, 2003:107).

These two effects make distinctly different

changes in a distribution, however, and the next sections describe the ways in which
these two effects of capability act on the distribution of risk.
3.2.4.1. Prevention
Prevention is a reduction in the chance that any severity will occur. Under
complete prevention, there is no chance of any severity occurring, a riskless situation.
A preventive action could make it physically impossible for an adverse event to occur
or merely discourage or deter an enemy from creating that adverse event. In either
case, the risk is reduced by a decrease in the probability of any negative outcome.
Prevention may be a monotonically increasing function of capability, defined
between zero and one, as shown in Figure 15. That is, any increase in capability
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decreases the likelihood of an adverse event. In some cases, however, increasing
capability could encourage preemptive action from an enemy; in such a case an
increase in capability would increase the likelihood of an adverse event. This would
result in prevention as a decreasing function of capability. While this latter function is
possible, this research assumes increasing capability increases prevention over the
analysis time horizon.
100%
90%
80%
Prevention

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Capability

Figure 15. Examples of Prevention Functions

The prevention function focuses particularly on the capability being considered,
but potentially also includes any number of other capabilities with interactive effects.
A simple model assumes that the other capabilities provide negligible preventive
effect.
Minimum prevention occurs when capability is zero and the prevention from
other capabilities is negligible. This case does not imply that an adverse event is
guaranteed to occur, because the initial risk distribution could have a nonzero
probability that the adverse event will not occur even without any capability.
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Under prevention, the distribution function of the risk, rather than starting at
zero, starts at the prevention level (Kaas et al., 2001:27). Figure 16 shows three risks
with different levels of prevention. With low (0.1) prevention, the probability of at
least some severe outcome is high. As prevention increases, the probability of (at
least some) severity decreases, so risk decreases. Only the “starting value” of the

Prob(Severity>x)

distribution changes as prevention shifts; the shape of the distribution is unaffected.

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

.1 prevention

.5 prevention

.8 prevention

Severity

Figure 16. Effect of Prevention on Distribution of Risk

3.2.4.2. Mixed Discrete and Continuous Probability Distributions
This section describes the mathematics that allow prevention, where the risk
distribution “starts” at some value less than one.

In actuarial science, a claim

distribution can be a mixture of a discrete and continuous random variable when
there is some nonzero probability that the claim value is zero (Kaas et al., 2001:22). Let

X be a discrete random variable on the occurrence of an adverse event such that
⎧0 with probability p
X =⎨
⎩1 with probability 1 − p
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Let Y|X be a continuous, exponentially distributed random variable of the
severity of the adverse event, conditional on whether that event occurs. That is, Y
assumes the value 0 if X = 0 and Y ~ exponential(λ) if X = 1.

Then Y is the

unconditional random variable on severity, combining X and Y|X.

P{Y > y} = P{Y > y | X = 0}P{X = 0} + P{Y > y | X = 1}P{X = 1},

(14)

P{Y > y} = 0 p + e-λy (1 – p),

(15)

P{Y > y} = e-λy (1 – p).

(16)

In the more general case, when Y|X follows some general distribution, S(y), the
risk distribution function of Y is the severity distribution function of Y|X multiplied
by one minus the prevention value.

P{Y > y} = P{Y > y | X = 0}P{X = 0} + P{Y > y | X = 1}P{X = 1},

(17)

P{Y > y} = P{Y > y}(1 – p),

(18)

P{Y > y} = S(y) (1 – p).

(19)

3.2.4.3. Mitigation
Separate from prevention, a second possible effect of a change in capability is
mitigation, a reduction in severity if, despite one’s best efforts, an adverse event does
occur. While prevention affects the risk distribution, it has no effect on the severity
distribution. Mitigation changes the distribution of severity.
Like prevention, mitigation may be a monotonically increasing function of
capability.

That is, an increase in capability always reduces the severity of the

outcome. A case could exist, however, where increasing capability increases severity.
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For example, if improved mobility allows friendly forces to respond more rapidly to a
crisis, they may be more vulnerable to attack.
The effect of mitigation on the severity distribution function is not as clear as
the effect of prevention on the risk distribution function. An unmitigated severity
distribution stochastically dominates the mitigated severity distribution, but it is not
obvious how the distribution might change shape. (See Section 3.3.1 for explanation
of stochastic dominance.)
If mitigation equally affects all levels of severity, it makes the most sense for
mitigation to change a scale parameter of the distribution. The scale parameter
defines the measurement of the range of values.

Changing the scale parameter

spreads or tightens the distribution, while keeping the same essential shape (Law and
Kelton, 2000:198).
If mitigation primarily affects just part of the distribution, however, a change in
the shape parameter will be necessary. This would occur if an increase in capability

Prob(Severity>x)

only mitigated the most catastrophic severities, for example.
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0.6
0.5
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unmitigated

moderate mitigation
major mitigation

Severity

Figure 17. Effect of Mitigation on the Distribution of Severity
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3.2.4.4. Overall Model
When both prevention and mitigation are included, the overall distribution of
risk is

P{Severity > x} = (1 – p) P{Severitymitigated ≤ y}

(20)

Increasing prevention reduces the probability that any adverse event occurs,
while mitigation changes the shape or scale of the distribution of random variable of
severity. It will be necessary to model each mitigation effect on a case by case basis.
3.3. Measuring Risk
After a risk has been fully modeled, including a mapping from ordinal severity
categories to a continuous quantitative index and conditioning on capability, risks can
be measured. A risk measure is a number derived from a risk distribution that
summarizes the distribution in a single value. The remainder of this chapter explains
four basic tools for the measurement of risk: expectation, conditional expectation,
risk-value measurement and distortion functions.
There are two features of risk a good risk measure will capture. First, it should
include some aspect of the variation in the outcome. For two risks with the same
expected value, the one with the greater range or variability is generally considered
more risky. Second, a risk measure should capture something of the undesirable
consequences of outcomes. For two risks with the same shape of distribution, the one
with the higher expected severity is generally considered more risky (Sarin and
Weber, 1993:139).
If the analytic goal is to rank risks, risk measurement is only necessary when it
is unclear from the distributions which risk is less desirable than another. When the
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distributions can be ranked without using measurement, risks are stochastically
ordered. To understand stochastic orders, it is necessary to explain the concept of
stochastic dominance.
3.3.1. Stochastic Dominance
The cleanest ranking of risks occurs when one risk stochastically dominates
another. When one risk is stochastically dominant, it has a greater probability of
excessive severity at all points and the distribution functions never cross (Kaas
et al., 2001:226). Two such risks are shown in Figure 18, with the solid line risk
stochastically dominantly over the dotted line risk. Mathematically, consider two
risks with respective risk functions R1(x) and R2(x). The first risk is stochastically
greater than the second if R1(x) ≥ R2(x) for all x (Kulkarni, 1995:586).

1.0
0.9

Prob(Severity>x)

0.8

greater risk

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2

lesser risk

0.1
0.0

severity

Figure 18. Stochastically Dominant Risk

When stochastic dominance does not exist, or a decision maker requires a
quantification of the differences between risks, one of four risk measurement tools is
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appropriate.

Under dominance, the greater risk will always have a higher risk

measure. This fulfills the coherent risk measure axiom of monotonicity (Artzner
et al., 1999:210). The next four sections explain each of these measures, along with
their advantages and disadvantages.
3.3.2. Mathematical Expectation Measure
The simplest measure of risk is the mean or expected severity.

The

mathematical expectation of a risk can be calculated using the probability density
function, f(x), or the risk distribution function, R(x), by integrating over the entire
range of severities (Kulkarni, 1995:562) as shown in Equation (21).

Risk Measureexpectation = E[X] =

∫

∞

0

xf ( x )dx =

∞

∫ R(x )dx .
0

(21)

The advantage of expectation as a risk measure is its common use and
familiarity to decision makers. The major disadvantage is that the expectation is
largely unaffected by changes in the tail of the distribution, leading decision makers
to ignore the highly unlikely but catastrophic outcomes. The risk assessment and
management process is generally most concerned with those catastrophic outcomes
(Haimes, 1998:17).

The three remaining risk measures seek to overcome this

shortcoming of expectation by giving extra consideration to the extreme outcomes.
3.3.3. Risk-Value Measure
Risk-value begins to deal with the major problem of expectation by including
the second moment of the distribution, the variance. In a risk-value measure the
decision maker commits to some tradeoff between (expected) value and the
uncertainty associated with an outcome (Sarin and Weber, 1993:136).
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The simplest risk-value measure is a linear combination of expectation and
variance, or expectation and standard deviation (Sarin and Weber, 1993:137).

Risk measurerisk value = a E[X] – (1-a) σX

(22)

where σX is the standard deviation of X and a is a value between 0 and 1.
The variance of the risk distribution can be calculated similarly to the
expectation, with the probability density function or the risk distribution function.
Equation (23) shows the common form of variance calculation, and Equations (24)
and (25) follow as forms specific to risk distributions with distribution function R(x).

∫

Var[X] =

∞

0

x 2 f ( x )dx − (E [X ])
∞

= 0 2 p( X = 0) + ∫ x 2
0

=

∫

∞

0

2

(23)

2
∞
d
(1 − R(x ))dx − ⎛⎜ ∫0 R(x )dx ⎞⎟
⎝
⎠
dx

(24)

2

∞
x 2 d (1 − R ( x )) − ⎛⎜ ∫ R ( x )dx ⎞⎟ .
⎝ 0
⎠

(25)

The standard deviation follows as the square root of the variance.
For an exponentially distributed risk, with probability (1-p) of occurrence of an
adverse event and parameter λ, the expectation and variance can be calculated as

E[X] =

∞

∫ R(x )dx

(26)

0

∞

= (1 − p ) ∫ e − λ x dx

(27)

= (1-p) / λ.

(28)

0

Var[X] =

∫

∞

0

x 2 f ( x )dx − (E [ X ])
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2

(29)

∞

= ∫ x (1 − p ) λ e
2

−λ x

0

=

1 − p2

λ2

⎛1− p ⎞
dx − ⎜
⎟
⎝ λ ⎠

2

.

(30)

(31)

One advantage of the risk-value measure is that it does not require that the
entire distribution be specified.

If the analyst can determine just the first two

moments of the distribution, a risk-value measure can be calculated.

A second

advantage is that the measure can be plotted against the tradeoff parameter, a, so the
decision maker can visualize the tradeoff between expectation and variance.
Consider two risks shown in Figure 19. The solid line risk, which has a greater
probability of an adverse event occurring, has the larger expected severity. The
dotted line risk, which has a lower probability of an adverse event occurring but a

Prob(Severity>x)

heavier distribution tail, has a larger variance.
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Figure 19. Undominated Risks

Figure 20 shows the tradeoff in the risk-value measure as priority is moved from
expectation to standard deviation.

When standard deviation is the most highly
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weighted component, the heavier-tailed dotted line risk has the greater risk measure.
When expectation is weighted higher than 0.6, the solid line risk has the greater risk
measure. When uncertainty in outcome, measured by the standard deviation, is a
significant consideration, the dotted-line risk should be considered more risky. If the
uncertainty of outcome is relatively unimportant, and the focus is almost exclusively

Risk-Value Risk Measure

on expected severity, the solid-line risk is the most significant.
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Figure 20. Risk-Value Measure of Risk

A disadvantage of the risk-value measure is the uncertainty of the appropriate
tradeoff value. Increasing the weight on standard deviation does not necessarily
increase the focus on catastrophic events. In addition, breakpoints where one risk
measure crosses another do not have a clear interpretative value.
3.3.4. Conditional Expectation Measure
Conditional expectation is a third possible measure of risk.

This measure

completely ignores the low severity portions of the risk distribution, focusing on the
distribution tail and the worst possible outcomes as shown in Figure 21. The risk
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measure is the expected severity, given that severity is greater (worse) than some
target or accepted value. That value can either be a severity threshold, or a quantile of
the distribution (Benati, 2003:574).
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Prob (Severity>x)
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0.50
0.40
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0.20
0.10
0.00
t

severity

Figure 21. Conditional Severity

The calculation of the conditional expectation risk measure comes from the
calculation of residual system life in reliability.

Residual life is the expected

remaining working time of a system, given that the system has already been in
operation for a specified period of time (Ebeling, 1997:34).

For this study, the

conditional expectation risk measure, instead of conditioning on time, conditions on
some severity threshold, t.

Risk Measureconditional expectation = E[Severity | Severity > t]
=t+

1 ∞
R( x)dx
R(t ) ∫t

(32)
(33)

The conditional threshold can be determined in two different ways. First, the
threshold can be specified directly as a severity value. For example, the risk measure
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could be expected severity, given that severity is greater than minor. Alternatively,
the threshold can be calculated from a specified quantile of the distribution. For
example, the risk measure could be the expected severity, given that severity is in the
80th percentile of the distribution.
To calculate the threshold based on a specified quantile requires the inverse of
the risk distribution function. For the exponential distribution

R(threshold) = α = (1-p) e-λ threshold

(34)

threshold = – ln (α/(1-p)) / λ

(35)

With a specified severity threshold or distribution quantile, conditional
expectation provides a single risk measure. The measure can be plotted as a function
of the chosen severity threshold to show the analyst or decision maker how the risk
ranking might vary. Figure 22 shows the risk measure of the risks in Figure 21 as a
function of specified severity threshold. When the threshold is low, and most of the
distribution is considered in the calculation, the solid line risk has the higher measure
and is considered more risky. As the severity threshold increases, the dotted line risk,
with a thicker distribution tail, becomes the risk with the higher measure.
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Conditional Expectation

severity threshold

Figure 22. Conditional Expectation as a Function of Severity Threshold

Figure 23 shows the alternative formulation of the conditional expectation risk
measure. The measure is plotted as a function of the proportion of the distribution, α,
included in the expectation calculation. As α decreases, less of the distribution is
included in the calculation, and the risk measure increases for both risks. Similar to
the results from the specified threshold approach, when the risk measure is calculated
in the distribution tail only, the heavier-tailed solid risk has the higher measure. As a
larger fraction of the distributions are included, the dotted line risk has the higher risk
measure.
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Conditional Expectation
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Figure 23. Conditional Expectation as a Function of Quantile

The primary advantage of the conditional expectation risk measure is its focus
on the most severe possible outcomes. If the tail of the risk distribution is properly
specified, the portion of the distribution in the low severity outcomes does not have to
be correct. In addition, the prevention variable is not required at all, since the risk
measure is calculated assuming an adverse event does occur. In effect, this risk
measure does not distinguish between the risk and severity distributions, and either
can be used in calculations. Finally, the measure is relatively easy to explain to a
decision maker, and allows the analyst to vary the amount of the distribution used in
the calculation to perform a sensitivity analysis.
The biggest disadvantage of the conditional expectation risk measure is that it
ignores a large portion of the distribution. Two risks with similar tails but different
prevention parameters will have similar risk measures under this approach. Decision
makers concerned about the probability of occurrence will not be able to properly
indicate their preferences with this risk measure. Thus the conditional expectation
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risk measure is only appropriate when the entire focus of the decision maker is on the
worst possible outcomes.
3.3.5. Distorted Expectation Measure
The final proposed measure of risk is the distorted expectation risk measure.
This measure “distorts” the risk distribution function and then calculates the
expectation of the distorted function. Several distortion functions are available. All
of them, however, re-weight the densities, emphasizing more catastrophic severities
and deemphasizing—but still including—less catastrophic ones.

This avoids the

problem of conditional expectation’s ignoring a portion of the distribution (Wirch
and Hardy, 1999:337).
Figure 24 shows a density function and its distortion. The distortion “pushes”

likelihood

density into worse severities.

distorted density

actual density

severity

Figure 24. Actual and Distorted Severity Density Functions
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Figure 25 shows a risk distribution and its distortion. The distorted distribution
dominates the actual distribution at all levels of severity, reflecting the fact that the
probabilities have been rescaled toward the worse severities. This places a greater
emphasis on higher severities, which may be so unlikely as to have little effect on the
undistorted expectation.

Under the emphasis caused by distortion, these high

severities are effectively given a higher priority. If the decision maker has no desire
to emphasize the higher severities, undistorted expectation is an appropriate measure
of risk.
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0.8
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0.6
0.4
0.2

actual distribution

0.0
severity

Figure 25. Actual and Distorted Risk Distribution Functions

The actuarial science literature identifies six different distortion functions,
though some are special cases of others (McLeish and Reesor, 2003:141). All distortion
functions operate on the risk distribution.

The distribution can be distorted by

applying the chosen distortion function, g(u), to the risk distribution function as
follows:

Rdistorted(severity) = g(R(severity))
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(36)

Regardless of the distortion function used, the risk measure is the expected
value of the distorted distribution (McLeish and Reesor, 2003:137), calculated as the
integral of the distorted distribution over the entire range of severity. Increasing the
distortion, which increases the relative weight on the more extreme outcomes, will
increase the value of the risk measure.

Risk measuredistorted expectation =

∞

∫ g (R(x ))dx
0

(37)

The gamma-beta distortion requires three parameters, a, b and c such that 0<a≤1,

b≥1, c≥0, and is the most general and flexible distortion (McLeish and
Reesor, 2003:141). If the parameters a and b have values of one and the c parameter
approaches infinity, there is no distortion. Decreasing a or c, or increasing b increases
the amount of distortion, shifting the distribution into the tail.

∫ t (1 − t )
∫ t (1 − t )
u

gγβ(u) =

0
1

a −1

b −1

e

a −1

b −1

e

0

−t
−t

c

dt

c

dt

(38)

The beta distortion allows the c parameter in the gamma-beta distortion to
approach infinity, leaving a distortion function with two parameters (McLeish and
Reesor, 2003:141). As with the gamma-beta distortion, if the a and b parameters equal 1
there is no distortion.

Decreasing the former or increasing the latter increases

distortion.

gβ(u) =

Γ(a + b ) u a −1
b −1
t (1 − t ) dt
∫
0
Γ(a )Γ(b )
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(39)

The proportional hazards distortion is the beta distortion with the b parameter held
at one, leaving a single parameter with a simple distortion function (McLeish and
Reesor, 2003:141). This parameter is a measure of risk acceptance. When a is one,
there is no distortion, representing a risk neutral position.

Decreasing the a

parameter because of increasing risk aversion increases the distortion.

gph(u) = ua

(40)

The dual-power transform is the beta distortion with the a parameter held at 1,
leaving a single parameter, κ, which is equivalent to the b parameter (McLeish and
Reesor, 2003:142). When κ=1 there is no distortion; increasing κ, corresponding with
increasing risk aversion, increases distortion so that

gdp(u) = 1 – (1 – u)b.

(41)

Another special case of the gamma-beta distortion is the gamma distortion,
which holds the b parameter constant at one (McLeish and Reesor, 2003:142). The a
and c parameters are free to vary, and decreasing either of them increases the amount
of distortion.
u

gγβ(u) =

∫t
∫t
0
1

a −1
a −1

0
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e

e

−t
−t

c

dt

c

dt

(42)

The final special case of the gamma-beta distortion is the exponential distortion,
which holds a and b at one, with the c parameter free to vary (McLeish and
Reesor, 2003:142). Decreasing the single parameter increases the distortion.

gexp(u) = (1 – e-u/c) / (1 – e-1/c)

(43)

In addition to the gamma-beta distortion and its special cases, the normal
distortion can be used. This distortion, with one parameter, c, uses a standard normal
and inverse standard normal distribution (McLeish and Reesor, 2003:142).

g(u) = Φ[Φ-1(u) – c]

(44)

The literature does not provide specific guidance on when one distortion is
preferred to another (Reesor, 2003). However, the dual-power transform has two
particular advantages. First, it requires only a single parameter, while many of the
other distortions require two or three. Second, that parameter (κ) has a meaningful
interpretation. When κ is an integer, the resulting risk measure can be considered as
the expectation of the worst result in κ sample observations of the risk (Wirch and
Hardy, 1999:340).

Using the single-parameter dual-power distortion, risks can be

compared graphically by plotting them versus the value of the distortion parameter, κ.
Distorted expectation requires the entire risk distribution to be known, and
calculates a measure using the entire distribution, an advantage over the conditional
expectation risk measure.

Some distorted measures are complicated, requiring

multiple parameters, but the dual-power distortion requires a single parameter that
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serves as a measure of risk aversion. Using the dual-power distortion the analyst can
rank risks at several levels of risk aversion, including the undistorted expectation, a
risk-neutral measure.
The primary disadvantage of distorted expectation is its computational
complexity. As distortion increases the calculation becomes more and more complex,
and depending on the distribution function may not be analytically tractable. In
addition, unlike a risk-value measure, distorted expectation requires the entire risk
distribution to be known and specified. While the fact that the distorted expectation
risk measure uses the entire distribution is an advantage, the requirement that the
entire distribution be specified places a higher demand on subject matter experts.
3.4. Methodology Conclusions
In summary, risk can be mathematically modeled by treating it as a random
variable with an associated probability distribution, including both the probability of
occurrence of an adverse event and a distribution of the possible severities if an event
occurs. An exponential random variable has the advantage of simplicity, and may be
useful for modeling military risk when little is known about the distribution of
possible outcomes. Risk distributions can be summarized using a risk measure.
The simplest risk measure, unconditional and undistorted expectation, serves as
a baseline for the other three measures. The risk-value measure is equal to the
expectation when all the weight is on expectation and becomes less like expectation as
more weight is placed on the standard deviation.

The conditional expectation

measure is equal to the expectation measure when conditioning on the entire
distribution, and becomes less like expectation as the severity threshold moves farther
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into the distribution tail.

Finally, the distorted expectation measure is equal to

expectation when there is no distortion, and moves away as distortion increases.
Each of the alternatives to expectation, then, is a way to increase focus on the more
severe outcomes that are highly unlikely, but potentially so catastrophic that they
require the decision maker’s primary attention.
A risk-value measure requires only the first and second moments of a risk
distribution, but does not necessarily offer a way to increase focus on the worst
outcomes.

A conditional expectation risk measure focuses exclusively on the

distribution tail, ignoring low severity regions of the distribution. When a risk
distribution can be completely specified, a distorted expectation measure, using the
dual-power distortion function on the risk distribution offers a flexible tool for
decision makers to summarize risk in a single number.
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IV. Numerical Illustration and Results

4.1. Implementation Overview
This chapter provides an illustration of the use of risk modeling and risk
measurement techniques presented in Chapter III. The nine top-level capabilities
from the CRRA master capabilities library are reviewed. Using four future global
scenarios, each capability is given a notional, associated risk distribution. These risk
distributions are measured using the dual-power distorted expectation. Finally, each
risk measure is used to re-weight objective function coefficients in a linear program to
suggest acquisition priorities.
4.2. Optimization of Risk and Capability Alternatives
The goal of the CRRA is to integrate assessments of current capability and risk
of capability shortfalls, suggest appropriate courses of action and ultimately provide
guidance to the acquisition process (Jumper, 2002). Future systems purchased by the
Air Force purchases should reduce the shortfalls identified by the CRRA process.
Risk measures provide a way not only to prioritize capability shortfalls but also to
adjust the relative value of potential systems under consideration.
If the Air Force has a set of possible future systems, each providing some
additional capability, and a budget constraint limiting the number of systems that can
actually be acquired, the problem can be formulated as a mathematical program. The
objective is to maximize total value, while staying within the budget. Risk measures
can be used to adjust the values of each system, based on the relative importance of
the capability shortfall that system starts to close.
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Under this construction, risk becomes a weighting of the importance of each
capability shortfall. Shortfalls identified as “more risky” will have higher measures
of risk, effectively increasing the value of closing the capability gap, while shortfalls
identified as “less risky” will have smaller measures of risk, and the value of any
additional capability will be reduced.
For example, consider risks associated with each of the nine top-level
capabilities identified by the Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment process. The
full Master Capabilities Library is included in Appendix B.

The nine broad

capabilities are as follows:
•

Surveillance & reconnaissance involves conducting missions to satisfy the
intelligence requirements of commanders.

•

Intelligence is developing “knowledge resulting from the collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning
foreign countries or areas.”

•

Command & control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned and attached forces.”

•

Communications is the representation, transfer, interpretation and processing of
data between people and machines.

•

Force application means engaging “a variety of targets throughout the battlespace.”

•

Force projection is the means to “extend national power around the globe in a timely
manner.”

•

Protection involves “offensive and defensive actions required to respond to a full
spectrum of threats and protect forces.”

•

Preparation & sustainment are the “activities required to establish operating locations,
generate the mission … and create forces.”

•

Force creation is the organizing, equipping, and training of combat and support
personnel.
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A shortfall in any of these nine capabilities creates a situation in which negative
consequences could occur. The next section uses a notional framework of the future
state of the world to estimate the likelihood and severity of the consequences
associated with the nine identified capabilities.
4.3. Future Scenarios
Projecting the future security environment is a difficult task.

Today, the

United States is the preeminent military power in the world, but still faces numerous
threats. While the U.S. does not appear to face a threat to its global power in the next
few years, within decades the circumstances could differ significantly. Because the
acquisition process for implementation of new technologies can be long, considering a
different future is an important exercise.
One way to focus thinking for estimating risk in the future is scenario analysis.
After falling out of favor, scenario analysis is returning as a popular form of risk
assessment in the corporate world as risk analysts broaden their scope from purely
financial risks to risks of terrorist attack, loss of company reputation, and supply or
operations failures (Survey of Risk, 2004:14).
In April 1996 a team of Air Force officers produced a report, Alternate Futures for
2025: Security Planning to Avoid Surprise, suggesting several directions for global
security. They developed these scenarios by creating three dimensions of global
politics. The first, “American world view,” is a measure of the degree to which the
United States interacts with the rest of the world and ranges from “domestic” to
“global”.

The second dimension, “∆TeK”, is a measure of the growth and

proliferation of technology and ranges from “constrained” to “exponential.” The
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third dimension, “world power grid,” is a measure of the dispersion of power and
ranges from “concentrated” to “dispersed” (Englebrecht, 1996:x). Combining these
three dimensions the report team created four visions for the future, focusing on the
extreme positions of the three dimensions.
In order to illustrate the approaches discussed in this thesis, assume subject
matter experts provide their best estimates of the likelihood of future severities. The
following data on future risk are purely notional predictions of the future for each of
the four scenarios. For some capabilities, assume the experts provided an overall
chance of an adverse event happening, and an average or expected severity if an
adverse event occurs. For other capabilities, assume the experts provided an overall
chance of occurrence of an adverse event and two exceedance probabilities: the chance
that severity will be worse than the modest severity category and the chance that
severity will be worse than the major severity category.
The Gulliver’s Travails vision assumed a global American world view,
concentrated technology and dispersed global power. In this future world, the United
States military struggles with worldwide commitments and diverse operations
(Englebrecht, 1996:xi).

For the notional example, assume subject matter experts

assess future risk in the Gulliver’s Travails scenario according to the parameters
specified in Table 8. In this scenario surveillance & reconnaissance, intelligence, command
& control, communications and force projection are the capability shortfalls with relatively
high risk.
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Table 8. Notional Risk Data for Gulliver’s Travails
Capability shortfall
Surveillance & reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & control
Communications
Force application
Force projection
Protection
Preparation & sustainment
Force creation

Chance of
adverse event
0.96
0.62
0.68
0.96
0.83
0.56
0.08
0.12
0.02

Avg severity if
event occurs
--3.125
9.375
------18.75
--9.375

Prob of severity
> modest
0.740
----0.560
0.580
0.270
--0.090
---

Prob of severity
> major
0.0700
----0.0500
0.0060
0.0080
--0.0100
---

In the second vision, Zaibatsu, a domestic American world view combines with
exponential technology growth and power concentrated in a few multinational
corporations to form a superficially peaceful world. The U.S. military struggles to
remain relevant in this future, where the largest security threat comes from
instability due to income inequity (Englebrecht, 1996:xii). For the notional example,
assume subject matter experts assess future risk in the Zaibatsu scenario according to
the parameters specified in Table 9. In this scenario surveillance & reconnaissance,
intelligence, command & control, communications, protection, preparation & sustainment and
force creation are the capability shortfalls with relatively high risk.

Table 9. Notional Risk Data for Zaibatsu
Capability shortfall
Surveillance & reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & control
Communications
Force application
Force projection
Protection
Preparation & sustainment
Force creation

Chance of
adverse event
0.40
0.06
0.09
0.24
0.05
0.11
0.56
0.50
0.50

Avg severity if
event occurs
--3.125
9.375
------9.375
--3.125
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Prob of severity
> modest
0.060
----0.160
0.005
0.060
--0.420
---

Prob of severity
> major
0.0080
----0.0060
0.0002
0.0100
--0.0200
---

In the third vision, Digital Cacophony, America maintains its global interests in
the face of exponential technological growth and dispersed global power. The main
threat faced by the U.S. military in this scenario is advanced weapons of mass
destruction and cyber attacks (Englebrecht, 1996:xii).

For the notional example,

assume subject matter experts assess future risk in the Digital Cacophony scenario
according to the parameters specified in Table 10. In this scenario force application,
protection, preparation & sustainment and force creation are the capability shortfalls with
relatively high risk.

Table 10. Notional Risk Data for Digital Cacophony
Capability shortfall
Surveillance & reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & control
Communications
Force application
Force projection
Protection
Preparation & sustainment
Force creation

Chance of
adverse event
0.59
0.77
0.60
0.87
0.76
0.90
0.54
0.66
0.61

Avg severity if
event occurs
--9.375
3.125
------3.125
--9.375

Prob of severity
> modest
0.540
----0.410
0.580
0.250
--0.570
---

Prob of severity
> major
0.0500
----0.0500
0.1100
0.0070
--0.0070
---

In the final future vision of the world, King Khan, the United States role in the
world shrinks and a peer competitor in Asia takes over as the primary global power.
The U.S. military faces drastically reduced budgets and must prioritize which
capabilities it will keep (Englebrecht, 1996:xii). For the notional example, assume
subject matter experts assess future risk in the King Khan scenario according to the
parameters specified in Table 11. In this scenario force application and force projection
are the capability shortfalls with relatively high risk.
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Table 11. Notional Risk Data for King Khan
Capability shortfall
Surveillance & reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & control
Communications
Force application
Force projection
Protection
Preparation & sustainment
Force creation

Chance of
adverse event
0.20
0.47
0.35
0.04
0.45
0.16
0.21
0.26
0.23

Avg severity if
event occurs
--3.125
18.75
------3.125
--18.75

Prob of severity
> modest
0.190
----0.010
0.400
0.004
--0.130
---

Prob of severity
> major
0.0400
----0.0020
0.0100
0.0003
--0.0200
---

4.4. Overall Probability Estimation
Overall risk distributions can be built based on the likelihood that any of these
scenarios is likely to occur.

Using conditional expectation, the likelihood of an

adverse event can be calculated as the sum of the severity given a scenario, times the
likelihood of the scenario.

P{Severity>0} = P{Severity>0 | Gulliver’s Travails} P{Gulliver’s Travails}
+ P{Severity>0 | Zaibatsu} P{Zaibatsu}
+ P{Severity | Digital Cacophony} P{Digital Cacophony}
+ P{Severity>0 | King Khan} P{King Khan}.

(45)

Table 12 shows the combined probabilities and severities assuming each scenario
is equally likely. The scenarios do not have to be equally weighted however. For
illustrative purposes, assume severity doubles for each categorical step increase, and
assume catastrophic severity is defined as any severity greater than 100. For the
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categorical specifications of expected severity the midpoint of the category interval
has been used to calculate an average.

Table 12. Combined Quantitative Risk Descriptions
Capability shortfall
Surveillance & reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & control
Communications
Force application
Force projection
Protection
Preparation & sustainment
Force creation

Event
likelihood
0.54
0.48
0.43
0.53
0.52
0.43
0.35
0.39
0.34

Prob of severity
> modest
0.38
----0.29
0.39
0.15
--0.30
---

Avg if event
occurs
--4.7
10.2
------8.6
--10.2

Prob of severity
> major
0.04
----0.03
0.03
0.01
--0.03
---

For risks with likelihood of occurrence and average severity, an exponential
distribution can be fit. The risk distribution can be defined as

P{Severity > x} ≡ R(x) = (1-p) e-λx

(46)

The p parameter is the complement of the probability of occurrence. The λ parameter
can be calculated using the specified average severity. Because this was specified as
the average if an event occurs, the calculation is made without regard for p.
∞

Average severity = ∫ R ( x )dx =
0

∫

∞

0

e −λx dx

λ = 1 / (Average severity)

(47)
(48)

For risks with estimated likelihood of occurrence and two additional probability
estimates, a Weibull distribution can be fit. The risk distribution can be defined as

P{Severity > x} ≡ R(x) = (1-p) exp(-λβxβ)
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(49)

The p parameter is the complement to the probability of occurrence. The λ and β
parameters can be calculated by simultaneously solving the other two specified
probabilities.

R(modest) = R(12.5) = (1-p) exp(-λβ12.5β)

(50)

R(major) = R(50) = (1-p) exp(-λβ50β)

(51)

⎞⎟ − ln⎛⎜ S (modest )
⎞⎟⎤
ln ⎡⎢ln⎛⎜ S (major )
(
)
(
)
1
−
1
p
p
−
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠⎥⎦
β= ⎣
⎞
ln⎛⎜ major
modest ⎟⎠
⎝

(52)

⎧
⎧
⎡ − ln⎛ S (modest )
⎡ − ln⎛ S (major )
⎞⎟ ⎤ ⎫
⎞⎟ ⎤ ⎫
⎜
⎜
⎪
⎪
⎥
⎢
(
)
(
)
1
p
1
p
−
−
1
⎪
⎪⎪ 1 ⎢
⎪
⎝
⎠ = exp
⎝
⎠ ⎥ ⎪⎪
λ = exp⎨ ln ⎢
⎨ ln ⎢
⎥⎬
⎥ ⎬ (53)
β
β
β
modest
major
⎪
⎪β ⎢
⎪
⎥
⎢
⎥⎪
⎪⎩
⎣
⎦ ⎪⎭
⎣
⎦ ⎭⎪
⎩⎪
Table 13 shows the parameters of the fitted distributions and Figure 26 shows
these risks graphically.

Table 13. Risk Distribution Parameters
Surveillance & reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & control
Communications
Force application
Force projection
Protection
Preparation & sustainment
Force creation

p
0.4625
0.5200
0.5700
0.4725
0.4775
0.5675
0.6525
0.6150
0.6600

λ
0.0345
0.1024
0.0423
0.0425
0.0351
0.0643
0.0404
0.0327
0.0335

β
1.4528
----1.1357
1.6393
0.9800
--1.7018
---

Note that an exponentially distributed risk is equivalent to a Weibull distributed risk
with a β parameter equal to one.
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Figure 26. Graphical Depiction of Risks Associated with Nine Capabilities

4.5. Risk Prioritization and Measurement
With risk distributions fully specified, risks can be analyzed for prioritization
and measurement. The first step is to identify any sets of risks with stochastic
dominance.

This provides ordinal ranking, but has no associated value.

Risk

measurement then follows for all nine risks using the distorted expectation risk
measure.
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4.5.1. Stochastic Dominance
These risks can be analyzed for stochastic dominance by setting the distribution
functions equal to each other. If a solution exists to this equation, and the solution is
not a point of tangency, the distribution functions cross and neither risk dominates
the other.

R1(x) = R2(x)

(1 − p1 )e− λ

1

β1 β1

x

(54)

= (1 − p2 )e − λ2

β2 β2

x

(55)

⎛1− p ⎞

1
⎟⎟ = 0
λ1 β x β − λ 2 β x β − ln⎜⎜
−
1
p
2 ⎠
⎝
1

2

1

2

(56)

In the example, every pair of risks has a solution to this equation with the
exception of the surveillance & reconnaissance and preparation & sustainment risks, shown
in Figure 27. Over the entire severity range, surveillance & reconnaissance has a greater
probability, so it stochastically dominates preparation & sustainment, and will have a
larger risk measure regardless of what risk measure is used.

Surveillance & Reconnaissance Risk

Preparation & Sustainment Risk

1.00

Prob(Severity>x)

0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
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0.40
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0
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severity

Figure 27. Stochastically Ordered Risks
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50

60

4.5.2. Risk Measurement
The expected value of the exponential distributed risks is

1− p

λ

and the

⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛1 ⎞
⎟⎟Γ⎜
expected value of the Weibull distributed risks is (1 − p )⎜⎜
⎟ . Table 14 shows
⎝ λβ ⎠ ⎝ β ⎠
the expected severities of each of the nine risks.

Table 14. Expected Severity Risk Measure
Risk
Surveillance & reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & control
Communications
Force application
Force projection
Protection
Preparation & sustainment
Force creation

Expected Severity
14.1
4.7
10.2
11.8
13.3
6.8
8.6
10.5
10.2

Priority Order
(1)
(9)
(5)
(3)
(2)
(8)
(7)
(4)
(6)

Under the expected value measure of risk, the surveillance & reconnaissance
capability has the greatest risk, followed by the force application capability.

The

intelligence capability has the smallest associated risk. Again, it is important to note
that these are all purely notional values.
The distorted expectation risk measure can be calculated by

(

)

Risk Measuredistorted = ∫ 1 − [1 − R ( x )] dx
∞

0

κ

(57)

where larger κ creates larger distortion and corresponds to greater risk aversion, more
emphasis on the distribution tail. When κ is one there is no distortion and the
resulting measure is the undistorted expectation. Under increasing values of κ, the
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resulting expectation is the κth order statistic, that is, the expected worst outcome if κ
samples are taken of the random variable.
Distorted Expectation
60

Force creation
Surv & recon
Command & control
Communications
Protection
Force application
Prepare & sustain
Force projection
Intelligence

50
40
30
20
10
0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Figure 28. Distorted Expectation Risk Measure as a Function of Risk Aversion

Table 15 shows the values of the distorted expectation risk measure for the nine
risks at three levels of distortion. With no distortion surveillance & reconnaissance is
the greatest risk, followed by force application. Intelligence is the capability with the
smallest amount of risk. With some distortion, surveillance & reconnaissance remains
the greatest risk, but force creation is the second highest. As distortion increases even
more, force creation becomes the greatest risk, followed by surveillance & reconnaissance.
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Table 15. Distorted Expectation Risk Measure
Risk
Surveillance & Reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & Control
Communications
Force Application
Force Projection
Protection
Preparation & Sustainment
Force Creation

No distortion
(κ=1)
14.1 (1)
4.7 (9)
10.2 (5)
11.8 (3)
13.3 (2)
6.8 (8)
8.6 (7)
10.5 (4)
10.2 (6)

Low distortion
(κ=5)
38.8 (1)
15.2 (9)
34.3 (5)
35.5 (4)
35.9 (3)
23.0 (8)
31.1 (7)
32.5 (6)
36.9 (2)

High distortion
(κ=10)
50.0 (2)
21.4 (9)
49.3 (3)
48.1 (4)
45.5 (6)
33.1 (8)
46.4 (5)
43.4 (7)
55.3 (1)

Force creation has the largest ascent in the rankings from zero to high distortion,
moving from the sixth highest risk to the greatest. Command & control, moving from
fifth to third, and protection, moving from seventh to fifth, also display changes in the
rankings.

Each of these risks has a relatively thick tail in its distribution, so

increasing the amount of distortion increases these risk measures most significantly.
Risks that fall in the rankings as distortion increases include force application,
from second to sixth, and preparation & sustainment, from fourth to seventh. These
risks have relatively thin tails in their distributions, so increasing the amount of
distortion has a small effect on the risk measure.
4.6. Potential Systems
Ultimately the goal of the CRRA process is to guide future system acquisition.
Risk measurement can play a role by quantifying the danger of a capability shortfall
and weighting the importance of closing that gap.
This section suggests a notional combination of future systems the Air Force
might consider. A limited budget means that every system on the list cannot be
acquired, so the goal is to determine the optimal mix of systems.
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In a December 2003 press release, the Air Force announced six capability
shortfalls identified by the first iteration of the CRRA process (U.S. Air Force, 2003).
•

Global information grid: The Air Force must create a massive system to collect,
process, and disseminate information for policy-makers and service personnel.

•

Battle space management: The service must create a useful operational picture
and implement war planning based on combat effects.

•

Fleeting and mobile targets: The service must reduce the time to find, track and
destroy enemy forces.

•

Battle damage assessment: The Air Force should build a toolkit and definitions
for commanders to analyze combat effects.

•

Base defense: Roles and responsibilities between the Air Force and the other
services must be clarified.

•

Cargo airlift: The Air Force should begin a formal review of requirements and
prepare for possible force structure changes.
Suppose that, based on these shortfalls, the Air Force identifies six systems for

possible future acquisition. Note that these are purely notional potential acquisition
projects.
•

Enhanced globally-accessible intelligence database

•

New heads-up display for fighter aircraft to increase pilot battlespace awareness

•

Standoff missile designed for use against mobile targets

•

Unmanned aerial vehicle with sensors specific for battle damage assessment

•

Detection equipment for chemical, biological and explosive devices at base entry
points

•

Additional strategic aerial refueling aircraft
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It is assumed that the intelligence database provides value in closing the
shortfall associated with the intelligence, command & control, communications, force
application, protection, preparation & sustainment and force creation capabilities.
The fighter aircraft HUD provides value in closing the shortfall associated with the
surveillance & reconnaissance, intelligence, command & control, force application,
force projection and force creation capabilities. The standoff missile provides value in
closing the shortfall associated with the command & control, force application and
force projection capabilities.

The UAV provides value in closing the shortfall

associated with the surveillance & reconnaissance, intelligence, communications and
force application capabilities. The detection equipment provides value in closing the
shortfall associated with the surveillance & reconnaissance, intelligence, protection,
preparation & sustainment, and force creation capabilities. The refueling aircraft
provides value in closing the shortfall associated with the force application, force
projection, preparation & sustainment, and force creation capabilities.
Table 16 shows the notional values of each of these potential systems for closing
the nine capability shortfalls, as well as the notional cost of each system. Where no
number is specified, the system is assumed to have negligible impact in closing the
capability shortfall.
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Table 16. Notional Reduction in Capability Shortfall by Potential Systems
Capability Shortfall
Surveillance & reconnaissance
Intelligence
Command & control
Communications
Force application
Force projection
Protection
Preparation & sustainment
Force creation
Cost

Intel
Fighter
database HUD
--0.19
0.46
0.21
0.34
0.19
0.14
0.42
0.10
0.21
--0.16
0.16
--0.19
--0.10
0.05
7
7

Standoff
missile
--------0.92
0.54
------10

BDA
UAV
0.26
0.12
--0.36
0.30
--------9

Base
detection Tankers
0.26
--0.68
----0.23
--0.05
--0.10
--0.11
0.25
--0.31
0.48
0.33
0.36
6
9

4.7. Optimization Solution
The optimal mix of systems to acquire can be solved using a “knapsack
problem” in which each potential system is assigned a binary decision variable that
takes on a value of one if the system is included in the set of systems to be acquired
and zero if it is excluded. An objective function to maximize is the sum of the binary
decision variables, with each variable multiplied by the relative value its system
provides.
Consider the set of nine desired capabilities and the set of six possible systems
for acquisition. An objective function of the acquisition problem to be optimized is
9 ⎛
6
⎞
Maximize ∑ ⎜⎜ RM i ∑ vij x j ⎟⎟
i =1 ⎝
j =1
⎠

6

subject to

∑c
j =1

j

xj ≤ b

(58)

(59)

where

RMi is the measure of risk associated with capability i, taking into account both
the probability of occurrence of an adverse event and the distribution of severity
if an adverse event does occur, i = 1, 2, … 9

4-17

vij is the value that system j brings to capability i, i = 1, 2, … 9, j = 1, 2, … 6
xj is a binary decision variable equal to one if system j is to be acquired and zero
if system j is to be rejected, j = 1, 2, … 6
cj is the cost of system j
b is the maximum available budget
Because the particular values of the risk measures do not have any meaning
beyond their relative relationship to each other, the value of the objective function at
optimality does not have a meaningful interpretation. Therefore, the usefulness of
the mathematical program is to identify the optimal mix of systems.
Objective function coefficients are the amount of the capability shortfall closed
by the system in question, adjusted for risk. The values in Table 16 are multiplied by
the associated risk measures. This results in inflated values for capability shortfalls
with higher risks and deflated values for capability shortfalls with lower risks.
Ignoring risk entirely and using a 23-unit budget, the optimal acquisition plan is
the intelligence database, standoff missile and base detection system. This leaves no
slack in the budget. If the budget is reduced by one to 22, those three systems have
become too expensive and the missile is exchanged for the HUD in the optimal mix
of systems. Under a budget increase there is no change in the optimal system mix
until the budget reaches 29. At that level it is possible to acquire four of the six
systems and the optimal mix includes the intelligence database, HUD, base detection
equipment and the new tankers.
Including risk in the objective function—by using the undistorted expectation
risk measure—results in an optimal system mix of HUD, standoff missile and base
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detection equipment.

The HUD is selected instead of the database because it

provides value to surveillance & reconnaissance, the highest ranked risk in the notional
example. The database does not provide any surveillance & reconnaissance value and
the largest portion of its value is in intelligence, which is the lowest ranked risk.
As with the risk-ignored solution, the optimal system mix is more sensitive to
budget reduction than budget increase. Reducing the budget by one to 22 changes the
optimal mix to the HUD, base detection equipment and new tankers. The budget
must increase to 29 before the optimal mix changes. Under that budget the optimal
mix includes the database, HUD, base detection equipment and new tankers.
Increasing risk aversion continues to change the optimal mix of systems to
acquire. Under low distortion (κ=5) the result is the same as for the undistorted
expectation risk measure. Raising the distortion to κ=10 for a distorted expectation
risk measure results in an optimal mix of HUD, base detection equipment and new
tankers. The tankers provide the most value of any system to force creation, which is
the highest ranked risk under high distortion.
Tightening the budget by two to 21 changes the optimal mix from the tankers to
the less expensive intelligence database. Increasing the budget by five to 29 allows for
an additional system to be acquired, and the optimal mix includes the database, HUD,
detection equipment and tankers.
In this notional analysis, the UAV is not included in the optimal acquisition
mix in any of these scenarios because of its relatively high cost and low value to the
nine capabilities.

Under any of the risk measures, including the risk-excluded

alternative, the UAV cost must fall from nine to three before it will become part of
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the optimal mix. Alternatively, the UAV will become part of the optimal mix (using
the κ=5 distorted expectation risk measure) if its value increases from 0.26 to 0.52 for
surveillance & reconnaissance, 0.12 to 0.78 for intelligence, 0 to 0.30 for command &
control, 0.36 to 0.65 for communications, 0.30 to 0.58 for force application, 0 to 0.44 for
force projection, 0 to 0.33 for protection, 0 to 0.31 for preparation & sustainment, or 0 to

0.28 for force creation. If none of these changes to the UAV program parameters are
realistic, the UAV may be eliminated from discussion to simplify the problem.
Table 17 summarizes the results for a 23-unit budget. The problem formulations
are included in Appendix C. The base detection equipment is included in the optimal
system mix regardless of risk measure and the unmanned aerial vehicle is never
included in the optimal mix.

Table 17. Optimization Summary Results

None
(risk measure=1)
Total cost
Intel database
Fighter HUD
Standoff missile
BDA UAV
Base detection
Tankers

23
buy
--buy
--buy
---

Risk Measure
Undistorted
Low Distorted
Expectation
Expectation
(κ=1)
(κ=5)
23
23
----buy
buy
buy
buy
----buy
buy
-----

High Distorted
Expectation
(κ=10)
22
--buy
----buy
buy

The mathematical optimization program can be made more robust and flexible
than the example given. The decision variables could be relaxed, for example, from
binary variables to any real value between zero and one. This would allow systems to
be acquired at less than full capability (Bretschneider, 1993:130). Alternatively, the
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decision variables could be allowed to take on integer values greater than one to model
acquiring multiple copies of a single system.
The constraint set can also be developed further, including more than just a
single budget constraint. In addition to budget or resource availability constraints,
integer and linear programming problems often include program balance constraints,
where the acquisition of one system either requires or does not allow the acquisition
of another (Bretschneider, 1993:130). For example, if the HUD and UAV should not
both be acquired, a constraint

HUD + UAV ≤ 1

(60)

prevents both systems from being included in the optimal mix.
4.8. Illustration Summary
This chapter illustrates one possible application of the methodology explained
in Chapter III. The illustration considers nine high-level capabilities from the CRRA
Master Capabilities Library, and four possible scenarios for future security
environments the U.S. Air Force may find itself facing. This framework allows
subject matter experts to make considered judgments about the probability and
severity of future events. These judgments can be combined into risk distributions.
The most difficult part of risk prioritization and measurement is correctly
determining the parameters of the risk distribution. The exponential and Weibull
distributions offer the advantage of requiring relatively few inputs from subject
matter experts.

When distributions have been specified, a distorted expectation risk

measure can be used to summarize each distribution in a single number for ranking
purposes. The amount of distortion must be determined by the analyst and decision
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maker according to the appropriate amount of risk aversion. The distortion can be
varied for sensitivity analysis, but should not be adjusted in order to give the “right”
answer.
The most natural use of a risk measure is to rank or prioritize risks. This
chapter suggests a further use, as an adjustment to the objective function coefficients
of a mathematical program to determine the optimal mix of new systems under a
limited budget. The greatest risks, with high risk measures, inflate the relative value
of systems that close capability shortfalls, while the smallest risks, with low risk
measures shrink the relative value of systems that close those shortfalls.
In addition to traditional sensitivity analysis performed on the budget or the
objective function coefficients, in this methodology the amount of distortion in the
risk measure can also be adjusted to test for the sensitivity of the optimal acquisition
mix. In the notional example, excluding risk from the acquisition decision resulted in
a different optimal solution from a solution using an undistorted expectation risk
measure. High distortion produced a third different optimal solution. These changes
in the solution represent optimal decision making at different levels of risk aversion.
Increasing the level of distortion corresponds to increased risk-aversion, and a greater
focus on the worst possible outcomes.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1. Background and Literature Conclusions
The study of risk works its way into many disciplines, and the military may be
able to enhance its own understanding of risk by borrowing from these approaches.
In the private sector, significant progress has been made toward the analytic goal of
understanding and quantifying risk. The growth in information technology, and the
amount of data collected on, for example, life spans, earthquakes and stock market
volatility, have allowed for increasingly complex mathematical models for
understanding and describing risk (Survey of Risk, 2004:4). Military risk lacks the
voluminous quantitative data of financial markets and mechanical components.
Building risk distributions, then, relies heavily on subjective expert forecasts.
The general field of decision analysis offers a number of tools relevant to the
risk ranking problem. Particularly when very little is known about the underlying
distributions of risks, and subjective expertise plays a large role, techniques like nonparametric decision rules and ranking algorithms like the lexicographic or ELECTRE
methodologies may be valuable. When possible, however, estimating more complete
distributions of risk will provide more insight.
Engineering approaches to risk focus on breaking complex systems into
component parts for simpler analysis. The CRRA master capabilities library will,
ideally, be an exhaustive list of mutually exclusive Air Force capabilities, broken
down

into

simple,

measurable

sub-capabilities.

This

is

effectively

the

componentization of the complex system of the United States Air Force. As the
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library grows more detailed, estimating risk parameters should become easier, but
more estimation will be required because of the number of lowest-level capabilities.
Financial risk approaches have emphasized the importance of using good
measures of risk to summarize and rank risk distributions. The variety of risk
measures proposed in the literature suggests that there is no single best equation and
decision makers and analysts must choose a measure appropriate for their particular
situation and goals (Reesor, 2003).
The methodology in this thesis borrows most extensively from actuarial
science, which may be the field most useful in the study of risk in a military context.
Insurance firms, with a portfolio of policies, manage multiple risks simultaneously.
Some of these risks will result in net losses to the firm, while many will never
involve a claim.

Similarly, the military must prepare to use many different

capabilities even though a significant number—perhaps a majority—will never be
employed in combat. The actuarial collective risk model, which considers claim
disbursements as a temporal stochastic process, may have application in the
assessment of risk in military logistics.
5.2. Methodology Conclusions
The first step in modeling risk is the determination and specification of
severity. The CRRA has taken significant steps in this process by identifying eight
factors to consider when estimating severity and defining six qualitative severity
categories (Appendix A). This thesis proposes a way to translate these categorical
severities into an index that can be mathematically manipulated. Categories express
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severities in rank order; an index shows the relative differences and the ratio of minor
severities that are equivalent to catastrophic ones.
Displaying risk visually for decision makers can be accomplished with
probability density functions, showing the likelihood over the range of possible
outcomes, or complementary distribution functions, indicating the probability of
severity exceeding some value. A severity distribution function, S(x), assumes an
adverse event will occur and is the probability that severity will be greater than x. A
risk distribution function, R(x), modifies this severity distribution function to allow
for the possibility that no adverse event occurs. In general this risk distribution
function is the preferred mathematical description of risk and can be shown
graphically to compare risks as shown in, for example, Figure 26.
This thesis proposes using an exponential distribution or Weibull distribution
to model risk. These distributions are simple to calculate, requiring relatively little
subjective input, and in the case of the exponential distribution have the intuitivelypleasing property that lower severities are more likely than higher severities. In
addition, the exponential and Weibull distributions are used in practice in actuarial
science (Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:78).
Many authors have proposed measures of risk to summarize distributions into a
single number. This thesis examines four that may be appropriate for measuring
military risk. Expectation, the most common risk measure, serves as a baseline for
the other three measures.

The risk-value measure, combining expectation with

standard deviation, only requires distribution moments to be known and not the full
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distribution. Conditional expectation calculates a risk measure exclusively using the
worst possible outcomes, focusing the decision maker on the most extreme severities.
All other things equal, however, the preferred risk measure is distorted expectation,
using a dual-power distortion measure. This measure calculates using the entire
distribution, re-weighting probabilities based on the relative importance of the highest
possible severities. The methodology results in a ranking of risks, a measure of risks
which provides at least some indication of the relative difference between the
riskiness of the various shortfalls, the ability to vary the measure of risk based on
decision maker risk aversion.
5.3. Future Research Opportunities
Risk in this thesis only covers negative consequences or severities. This is in
accordance with actuarial science and mechanical and environmental engineering risk
assessment. The financial literature however, considers risk in both the positive and
negative directions. Investment returns can be higher or lower than expected, a factor
that must be considered in building a portfolio.
In the assessment of military capabilities, positive risk may be equivalent to
redundancy. The CRRA may benefit from considering not only the capabilities
where the Air Force suffers from a shortfall, but also those capabilities where a
surplus exists. Future study may identify and measure the inefficiencies of this
“upside” risk.
This research proposes the exponential distribution, and the related Weibull
distribution, as possible models for military risk, primarily because of their simplicity.
Future study could confirm the usefulness of these distributions or suggest others as
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more appropriate. Insurance firms often model claims with a Pareto distribution, for
example, in addition to their use of the exponential and Weibull distributions
(Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:78). The dual-power distortion is recommended
because of its simplicity and interpretability.

Future research to confirm the

appropriateness of this distortion, or another more appropriate distortion, would be
valuable to the military community and the larger risk analysis field (Reesor, 2003).
The CRRA has defined severity according to eight factors. All of the risk
distributions and measures considered in this thesis require these factors be simplified
into a single dimension of severity. A multidimensional risk distribution might more
precisely describe military risk.

Other risk measurement techniques would be

required, however. Alternatively, a study of how to objectively combine severity
values from all eight factors into a single index would enhance the proposed
methodology.
Risk management is by nature defensive (Survey of Risk, 2004:13). Enormous
sums can be spent on an issue that appears potentially harmful. If nothing negative
happens, however, it is not necessarily clear if harm was prevented by the expense or
whether the risk management actions were wasteful. A study of the past efforts by
the military to prevent or mitigate perceived risk may provide insight into both the
assessment of risk and the actions that can be taken to reduce it.
5.4. Final Recommendations
To properly assess risk and include risk as one factor in future Air Force system
acquisition decisions, probability must be considered part of the analysis. For some
capability shortfalls there may be some probability that no severity occurs. Even if
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there is certainty that some adverse event will occur if a shortfall exists, the precise
severity of the outcome probably cannot be determined. Probability distributions
allow this range of possibilities to be described mathematically.
Risks should be analyzed for stochastic ordering. When two risk distribution
functions never cross, they are stochastically ordered, and one risk stochastically
dominates the other. This does not necessarily mean that the outcome of the lesser
risk will always be less than the greater, but the stochastically dominant risk can
always be considered more risky.
When stochastic dominance does not occur, or a quantification of risk is
required, the distorted expectation risk measure offers a flexible, mathematically
rigorous way to summarize the risk distribution in a single number. Unlike some
other risk measures, it includes the entire distribution in the calculation, and can be
adjusted to reflect decision maker risk aversion.
One of the primary responsibilities of senior leadership—in the corporate world
or the military—is the management of risk. Among all the aspects of the future for
which leadership must prepare, risk is a particular challenge because it involves a
range of possible outcomes and not an exact target (Survey of Risk, 2004:12). This
research offers a rigorous approach for the modeling and measuring of risk associated
with shortfalls in Air Force capabilities.
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Appendix A: Severity Categories and Descriptions

Enemy Escalation / WMD

Collateral
Damage

Friendly
Infrastructure

Friendly Capability

Friendly
Casualties

Achievement of Objectives

(AFSAA briefing, 2003)
Minor
All major objectives
achieved. Strong
initial strategy
requires few/no
adjustments.
Objectives achieved
on time.

Few citizens/troops
killed/ injured.
Citizens overseas
threatened.

Modest
All major objectives
achieved. Strong
initial strategy
requires modest
adjustments. Few
operational delays.
Few delays in
achieving campaign
objectives.

Substantial
All major objectives
achieved, but
strategy adjustments
required along the
way. Some
operations slowed.
Achievement of a
major objective
delayed.

Major
One or more major
objectives in jeopardy
of not being
achieved. Several
major strategy
adjustments required.
Advances toward
objectives
slowed/stalled.
Delayed achievement
of campaign’s major
objectives.
Hundreds to
Hundreds of
Tens of
citizens/troops killed/ citizens/troops killed/ thousands of
citizens/troops killed/
injured. Citizens
injured. Citizens
overseas attacked/ overseas attacked/ injured. Citizens
overseas killed/ taken
taken hostage.
injured.
hostage.
Superiority achieved
in/ over all areas on
time; no holdout
areas. Enemy
capabilities do not
disrupt any missions.
Almost all requests
for mutual support
fulfilled.

Superiority in/ over
enemy territory
delayed; a few
holdout areas
avoided. Enemy
capabilities disrupt
some missions. Most
requests for mutual
support fulfilled.

Few to dozens killed
or injured in collateral
damage. Local
damage/ destruction
to buildings/
infrastructure.

Dozens to hundreds
killed or injured in
collateral damage.
City-wide damage/
destruction to
buildings/
infrastructure.

Enemy offensives
stopped as they are
started. No threats to
friendly bases.
Continuous
monitoring of known
CBRNE sources.

Enemy offensives
stopped in their early
stages. Direct,
credible threats to
friendly bases.
Threat of CBRNE
use/attack possible.

Air/ land/ sea/ space
control unchallenged.
No combat losses.
All mutual support
requests fulfilled.

No loss of critical
infrastructure.

Extensive
One or more major
objectives not
achieved.
Inadequate strategy
requires many major
adjustments.
Advances toward
objectives stalled.
Major time pressures
to achieve objectives
and end campaign.

Catastrophic
Major objectives not
achieved. No
strategy adjustments
will allow objectives to
be achieved. Time
pressures force a
decision to end the
campaign without
achieving objectives.

Thousands to tens of
thousands of
citizens/troops killed/
injured. Citizens
overseas killed/ taken
hostage.

Hundreds of
thousands of
citizens/troops killed/
injured. Many
citizens overseas
killed/ taken hostage.

Superiority limited to
friendly territory or
achieved only for
specific missions;
significant areas
avoided. Major
unanswered
challenges from
enemy capabilities.
Unable to provide
mutual support.
Friendly centers of
Some damage to
gravity damaged or
friendly centers of
destroyed.
gravity. Regional
Widespread
damage/ loss of
critical infrastructure. damage/loss of
critical infrastructure.

Superiority in/ over
enemy territory not
completely achieved;
a few areas
continuously avoided.
A few unanswered
challenges from
enemy capabilities.
Mutual support only
for high priority
needs.
Local damage/ loss
Local/ limited damage Local damage to
critical infrastructure. of critical
to critical
No regional damage infrastructure.
infrastructure. No
Regional
regional damage or or loss.
infrastructure
loss.
affected.

Superiority in/ over
enemy territory
limited in area or
duration; some areas
avoided. Some
unanswered
challenges from
enemy capabilities.
Mutual support very
limited.

Hundreds to
thousands killed or
injured in collateral
damage. Regional
damage/ destruction
to buildings/
infrastructure.

Thousands to tens of
thousands killed or
injured in collateral
damage. Regional
damage/ destruction
to buildings/
infrastructure.

Tens of thousands
killed or injured in
collateral damage.
Multi-region damage/
destruction to
buildings/
infrastructure.

Hundreds of
thousands killed or
injured in collateral
damage. Widespread
damage/ destruction
to buildings/
infrastructure.

Enemy offensives
make some gains
before being driven
back. A friendly base
attacked and
damaged. Credible
threat of CBRNE
use/attack.

Enemy offensives
make significant
gains before being
driven back. More
than one friendly
base attacked. Some
CBRNE attacks, but
we have adequate
detection and
warning.

Enemy offensives
make significant
gains. Widespread
attacks on friendly
bases. Some enemy
use of CBRNE
weapons. No
warning for half the
attacks; adequate
warning for half the
attacks.

Enemy offensives
make gains we
cannot counter.
Widespread attacks
on friendly bases.
Widespread use of
CBRNE weapons with
no warning for most
attacks. Detection
occurs after attack.
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U.S. National Integrity
U.S. Government
Function

Minor
No enemy advances
toward US territory/
airspace. No terror
attacks/incidents on
US territory.

Modest
No enemy advances
toward US territory/
airspace. No terror
incidents on US
territory.

Substantial
Embassies fired on.
Conventional enemy
forces observe US
territory/ airspace; are
prevented from
encroaching. Terror
attack with
conventional
arms/explosives on
US territory.

Major
Conflict is nonnuclear but involves
terrorism, chemical,
bio, or radiological
strikes on US
territory. Embassies
occupied.
Conventional enemy
forces encroach upon
US territory/ airspace,
but do not fire on it.
Attack recovery is
State or federal first State government(s) State government
falters occasionally in difficult. Federal
responders may go executes well
executing recovery government focuses
on heightened alert. prepared recovery
on it above all else.
plans. Federal
No recovery action(s) actions. Federal
State government
government
government
required.
focuses on it above
assistance
assistance not
all else. Federal
necessary.
needed.
government
assistance required
for response.
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Extensive
US survives as a
nation. Active conflict
where enemies fire
on US territory/
penetrate US
airspace. Single
nuclear strike on US
territory. CBRNE
incidents.

Catastrophic
National survival
threatened, loss of
territorial integrity.
Long term exhausting
war. Entire nation
focused on resolving
conflict. Some
nuclear strikes on US
territory.

Federal and state
governments struggle
to cope with attack(s).
Losing war would
mean ideological and
cultural realignment.

Survival of a
functioning
government is
threatened. Losing
war would mean
ceding sovereignty or
occupation.

Appendix B: Master Capabilities Library
(AFSAA, 2004)
1.

2.

Surveillance & Reconnaissance. The capability to successfully conduct surveillance and
reconnaissance missions to satisfy Commanders’ Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
1.1.
Surveillance. The capability to systematically and continuously observe aerospace,
surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic,
photographic or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)
1.1.1. Conduct maritime surface/terrestrial surveillance
1.1.2. Conduct maritime subsurface/subterranean surveillance
1.1.3. Conduct air surveillance
1.1.4. Conduct space surveillance
1.1.5. Conduct environmental surveillance
1.1.6. Conduct information surveillance
1.2.
Reconnaissance. The capability to conduct transitory missions to obtain by visual
observation or other detection methods, specific information about the activities and
resources of an adversary or potential adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (AFDD
2-5.2)
1.2.1. Conduct maritime surface/terrestrial reconnaissance
1.2.2. Conduct maritime subsurface/subterranean reconnaissance
1.2.3. Conduct air reconnaissance
1.2.4. Conduct space reconnaissance
1.2.5. Conduct environmental reconnaissance
1.2.6. Conduct information reconnaissance
Intelligence. An integrated capability to provide accurate, timely information and thereby
achieve the Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA) required to plan and conduct operations.
(AFDD 2-5.2) It is the capability to develop information and knowledge as the result of
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available
information concerning foreign countries or areas (e.g. geographic, technological, etc.). (Joint
Pub 2-01.) General Categories of intelligence include Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement and Signature
Intelligence (MASINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).
2.1.
Processing and Exploitation. The capability to exploit and convert raw data info forms of
information that can be readily used by intelligence and environmental analysts/experts.
Processing and exploitation tasks include initial interpretation, data conversion and
correlation, document translation, and decryption, as well as providing the processed
information to follow-on phases of analysis.
2.1.1. Interpret and convert IMINT data
2.1.2. Decrypt and correlate SIGINT data
2.1.3. Translate and correlate HUMINT data
2.1.4. Conduct data conversion and correlate MASINT data
2.1.5. Interpret and correlate OSINT data
2.1.6. Process Mapping and Geodesy data
2.1.7. Process and build a coherent picture of the natural environment
2.2.
Analysis and Production. The capability to integrate, analyze, evaluate, interpret and
fuse processed information to create intelligence and environmental products in the
appropriate media that will satisfy the PIRs, other user requirements, or Battlespace
Awareness. Information becomes intelligence and environmental impacts knowledge at
the conclusion of this phase.
2.2.1. Produce Indications and Warning (I&W)
2.2.2. Produce Current Intelligence
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3.

2.2.3. Produce Targeting Intelligence
2.2.4. Produce General Military Intelligence
2.2.5. Produce Scientific/Technical Intelligence
2.2.6. Produce current and predicted environmental impacts knowledge
2.3.
Dissemination and Integration. The capability to format and disseminate intelligence
and environmental products to the requestor/consumer. The intelligence cycle is
complete when the requestor/consumer integrates the intelligence into decision making
and planning processes.
2.3.1. Provide Indications and Warning (I&W)
2.3.2. Provide Current Intelligence
2.3.3. Provide Targeting Intelligence, to include Battle Effects Assessments
2.3.4. Provide General Military Intelligence
2.3.5. Provide Scientific/Technical Intelligence
2.3.6. Provide Precise Mapping and Geodesy Information
2.3.7. Disseminate and integrate environmental impacts knowledge
2.4. Predictive Battlespace Awareness. The capability to correlate and fuse patterns of enemy
activity and subsequent events to predict adversary intent and/or potential future enemy
courses of action. PBA is used to enable effects based planning, execution and
assessment of an operation or operations in a theater. Fusing all sources of
data/intelligence to produce intelligence assessments inside the enemy’s decision loop.
Providing this information to commanders in time to protect friendly forces from enemy
attack or to maximize the element of surprise.
Command & Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command
and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 102 April 2001) Operations requiring C2 include Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Intelligence,
Communication, Force Application, Force Projection, Protection, and Preparation &
Sustainment.
3.1.
Monitor. The reception, monitoring, maintenance, integration, and display of
information on global actions, critical events, and crisis areas, to include the status of
friendly and non-friendly forces, rules of engagement (ROE), treaties, agreements, and
physical environmental conditions.
3.1.1. Receive information from all sources
3.1.2. Monitor information from all sources
3.1.3. Maintain information from all sources
3.1.4. Integrate information from all sources
3.1.5. Display information from all sources
3.2.
Assess. Determine the nature and impact of conditions and events to include the military
implications of intelligence indicators, environmental effects, and orders of battle.
Implies ability to develop total situational awareness, evaluate threats and opportunities
and to provide early warning and attack assessment to:
3.2.1. Determine and assess the nature and impact of critical events in the battlespace
3.2.2. Assess status of resources
3.2.3. Assess implications of fused, all source intelligence assessment combined with
current and predicted environmental impacts knowledge
3.2.4. Assess events relative to rules of engagement (ROE), treaties and agreements
3.2.5. Assess termination options, conditions, proposals
3.3.
Plan. Formulate the operational objectives, generate force lists, and force movement
requirements and develop, evaluate, and select courses of action and plans for friendly
forces.
3.3.1. Formulate Military Objectives
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3.3.2.
3.3.3.
3.3.4.
3.3.5.
3.3.6.

4.

5.

Develop potential COAs/Plans
Evaluate COAs/Plans
Select COA/Plan
Merge Generate and tailor force list and force Movement requirements
Develop Joint Air Operation Plan (JAOP), ISR Collection plans, Air Control
Order, Area Air Defense Plan, Air & Space Tasking Order, and other directives
and orders as required.
3.3.7. Coordinate planning with multi-agency partners, including military, national,
civil, and commercial organizations
3.3.8. Plan Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) Operations
3.4. Execution Authority. Conduct dynamic battle management and control, and adjust
operations as circumstances change.
3.4.1. Disseminate information
3.4.2. Convey execution authority for COA/plan
3.4.3. Retask based on effects based operation assessment
3.4.4. Interoperate with multi-agency partners, including military, national, civil, and
commercial organizations
3.4.5. Execute Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) Operations
3.5.
Position, Navigation, Timing
3.5.1. Provide position
3.5.2. Provide navigation
3.5.3. Provide timing
Communications. The ability to represent transfer, compute, and assure data among persons
and machines.
4.1.
Transport Information. Send voice, data, imagery, or video from one location and receive
it at another location(s).
4.1.1. Provide information transport to and from any location on the globe via space, air,
terrestrial or subsurface means.
4.1.2. Prioritized Information Delivery. Based upon commander’s quality of service
requirements and users’ needs.
4.2. Computing and Enterprise Services. Input, store, retrieve, process, display, access,
discover, and output information.
4.2.1. Store. Retain data in any form, usually for the purpose of orderly retrieval and
documentation.
4.2.2. Retrieve. Find and bring back requested data
4.2.3. Process. Operate on data with software applications for a specified purpose.
4.2.4. Display. Present information for use by a person.
4.2.5. Discover.
4.3. Assure. Protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.
4.3.1. Information.
4.3.2. Information Systems.
4.4. Manage and Control Network Resources and Network Systems.
4.4.1. Network Management. Provision network resources to meet capacity
requirements of the network’s users and connected devices.
4.4.2. Network Damage Assessment/Reconstitution. Automatic or manual methods to
detect/assess damage or degradation and return a network to service.
Force Application. Capability to survive and engage a variety of targets throughout the
battlespace by kinetic (nuclear and non-nuclear) and non-kinetic means.
5.1.
Survive and operate against air, space, surface, subsurface, maritime, information, and
asymmetric/unconventional threats
5.1.1. Gain awareness of threat prior to entering enemy detection envelope
5.1.2. Deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy (D5) the enemy F2T2E kill chain
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5.1.3. If unsuccessful, mitigate/negate effects of engagement by threat
Neutralize Threats/Targets – The actions necessary to engage a threat or target
assuming F2T2 are complete.
5.2.1. Transit to a weapons employment zone (WEZ) – Move to a position from which
a weapon may be delivered against the threat or target.
5.2.2. Deliver weapons – The primary capabilities-based threat/target classes are fixed
and moving/movable. Further subclasses include the full spectrum of target types
located in all environments subsurface, surface, air, suborbit, space, and the
infosphere. In these environments, weapons must achieve desired effects
including conventional, nuclear, non-kinetic, counter- CBRNE/Lowobservable/HDBT, informational, psychological, permanent, or temporary.
5.2.3. Support weapons as required from target designation through release until fuzing
or effective – update threat/target track as required during flyout of weapons to
ensure precise effects
5.3.
Recover Personnel and Materiel - the capability to locate, authenticate, and recover
downed combatants and materiel in enemy (Combat Search and Rescue), neutral, and
friendly environments
5.3.1. Report
5.3.2. Locate
5.3.3. Support
5.3.4. Recover
Force Projection. The ability to project and extend national power (military and non-military)
around the globe in a timely manner.
6.1.
Rapid Global Delivery. The timely movement, positioning, and sustainment of military
forces and capabilities through air and space, across the range of military operations.
6.1.1. Airlift. Worldwide transportation of personnel and materiel through the air which
can be applied across the entire range of military operations
6.1.2. Spacelift. The delivery of satellites, payloads and materiel to or through space.
Includes the capabilities of routine or on-demand launch and on-orbit
repositioning of space-based assets.
6.1.3. Sealift. Worldwide transportation of personnel and materiel via sea mode of
transportation which can be applied across the entire range of military operations
6.1.4. Surface Lift. Worldwide transportation of personnel and materiel via ground
mode of transportation which can be applied across the entire range of military
operations
6.2. Extend Air and Space Operations. The ability to increase range, loiter time, cargo load,
payload and orbit life of air and space assets
6.2.1. Air Refueling: Provide the in-flight transfer of fuel between tanker and receiver
aircraft for the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment for all
refuelable U.S. and coalition aircraft (includes fixed and rotary wing aircraft)
6.2.2. Provide on-orbit servicing: Support the inspection, repair, replacement, and/or
upgrade of spacecraft subsystem components and replenish spacecraft
consumables (fuels, fluids, cryogens, etc.) by another vehicle.
Protect. The integrated application of offensive and defensive actions that detect, assess,
predict, warn, deny, respond, and recover, preempt, mitigate, or negate from threats against or
hazards to air and space operations, critical infrastructure, and assets, and personnel based on an
acceptable level of risk. Includes Full Spectrum Threat Response to all threats, including
humanitarian and civilian, major accidents, natural disasters, and use of unconventional
(including WMD) or conventional weapons.
7.1.
Detect. The ability to detect threats to friendly resources (personnel, physical assets, or
information).
7.1.1. Sense CBRNE Threats at Point and Stand-off Distances

5.2.
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7.
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7.2.

7.3.

7.4.

7.1.2. Detect Health Threats: Ability to detect the effects of select nonweaponized
(naturally occurring) physical, biological and chemical threats on personnel and in
the environment. Ability to establish baseline levels of naturally occurring agents
and health assessments of personnel and to identify increases from the baseline.
7.1.3. Detect Conventional and Unconventional Threats. Detect the full range of threats
to Air Force operations, assets, and personnel including surveillance, conventional
capabilities, and asymmetric capabilities.
7.1.4. Detect Information Operations Threats
Assess and Predict. Accurately assess adversary capabilities to be used against friendly
personnel, physical assets, or information and precisely derive adversary courses of
action planned or employed with the intent to destroy or disrupt operational readiness.
Track threat and friendly location in order to predict future actions.
7.2.1. Assess and predict friendly vulnerabilities. Conduct assessments and predictive
analysis to identify and predict vulnerabilities.
7.2.2. Predict threat COAs against friendly resources (personnel, physical assets, or
information). Conduct predictive analysis of possible enemy COAs for the
purpose of effective planning and mitigation.
7.2.3. Assess identified threats. Provide positive identification of threat and assessment
of overall capability of the threat.
7.2.4. Track identified threats. Provide decision makers and responders with track/path
of threat.
7.2.5. Assess friendly COAs. Conduct assessment of friendly capabilities in order to
effectively plan and mitigate potential enemy COAs.
7.2.6. Track friendly forces. Provide decision makers and responders with track of
friendly forces.
Warn. Disseminate threat information in a timely, accurate, and unambiguous manner.
7.3.1. Provide military decision-makers with recommended courses of action. Provide
threat working group recommendation to decision makers, from base commander
to higher headquarters in a timely, accurate, and unambiguous manner.
7.3.2. Provide civil authorities warning of threat and recommended courses of action.
Provide an effective, timely means to communicate with civil authorities. May
require foreign disclosure authority.
7.3.3. Provide military/installation populace advanced warning of threat. Provide
commander’s channel, public affairs, giant voice, email and other means to warn
of threat.
7.3.4. Provide civil populace advanced warning of threat. Provide public affairs, email
and other means to warn of threat. Off base may require foreign disclosure
authority.
Deny and Respond. Includes Full Spectrum Threat Response. Support and offensively
and defensively resist threats directed against friendly personnel, physical assets, or
information in order to preserve operational readiness by both active and passive means.
Includes Full Spectrum Threat Response to all threats, including humanitarian and
civilian, major accidents, natural disasters, hazardous materiel incidents, and use of
unconventional (including WMD) or conventional weapons. Respond through preemptive, immediate, and sustained actions.
7.4.1. Deny Conventional or Unconventional Threats
7.4.2. Respond. Provide law enforcement and security, fire protection, EOD/WMD,
medical response, by lethal and/or non-lethal means, to the full spectrum of
emergencies, threats, hostile acts/events.
7.4.3. Provide Assistance to Civil Authorities: Includes Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities (MACA) in the US and overseas.
7.4.4. Provide Defensive Information Operations. The protection of critical information
systems and infrastructure. Capabiltities that prevent paralysis of critical
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infrastructure and prevent unauthorized or harmful activities on AF information
systems.
7.4.5. Provide Defensive Counterspace. Protect and prevent against Space
Threats/Targets and environment – the capability to perform defensive
counterspace operations in order to distinguish between attacks and anomalies,
withstand and defend systems from attack, and reconstitute and repair space
capabilities. (Note: The counter space functions of space surveillance/space
situation awareness are under Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Command and
Control, Communications master capabilities.)
7.5. Recover. The threat is defeated and recovery actions begin. (Residual threats may still be
present). These capabilities include medical treatment and support, damage repair,
cleanup actions, and actions to transition back to normal peacetime operations.
7.5.1. Recovery Operations
7.5.2. Medical treatment—restore health
7.5.3. Mortuary Operations
Prepare and Sustain. Activities required to establish operating locations, generate the mission,
support and sustain the mission, and posture responsive forces.
8.1.
Open & Establish Operating Locations. Assess, plan, reconfigure, modify, build, and use
a supportable infrastructure (industrial, administrative, medical, living) to support the
mission, personnel and equipment at specific locations from which operations are
projected or supported. This includes expeditionary as well as in-garrison operating
locations.
8.1.1. Provide operating location assessments. Collect and assess operational and support
infrastructure and security data, and plan for the support of operations from the
selected location. Includes: Collect - Collect pertinent pre-deployment data onlocation and/or remotely; Survey – Confirm the validity and accuracy of collected
data; Assess - Analyze location capability and operational support requirements;
and Plan – Plan base lay out and security requirements.
8.1.2. Establish runways, taxiways, ramps, roads, security perimeters, and building sites.
Utilize, initiate, build, and modify surface and vertical structures required to bring
a base’s airfield operating and support infrastructure to a functional condition or
preparatory state to accomplish the assigned mission.
8.1.3. Establish utility grid. Utilize, initiate, install, and modify power (electrical),
water, and wastewater infrastructure to a predetermined operational state.
8.1.4. Establish communications grid. Utilize, initiate, install, and modify a
telecommunications network to a predetermined operational state.
8.1.5. Establish fuel grid. Utilize, initiate, install, and modify a fuel storage and
distribution network of tanks, pipelines, and access points for aviation petroleum,
oils, lubricant, and propellant requirements to a predetermined operational state.
8.1.6. Establish facilities. Utilize, initiate, construct, modify, and assemble temporary or
permanent structure and infrastructure to a predetermined operational state.
8.2. Generate the Mission. Prepare and generate mission elements and payloads; initiate or
launch air, space, SOF, information, and HUMRO missions; recover mission elements;
and regenerate mission capability repetitively for the full range of mission operations.
8.2.1. Prepare and generate the mission element. repair, configure and inspect, and
provide to operations to accomplish the assigned mission.
8.2.2. Configure mission element. Set up for specific mission (configure and load
payload)
8.2.3. Support initiation/launch of mission element. Handoff to operator
8.2.4. Recover mission element. Receive and assess status of mission element
8.2.5. Prepare payload. configure for specific mission need (assemble payload, deliver for
loading)
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8.2.6. Prepare and configure launch and recovery apparatus. Repair, restore, and
configure apparatus used for support of mission element initiation, launch, or
recovery
8.2.7. Fuel mission element. Direct contact with mission element to provide POL and
other propellants required for mission element initiation/launch.
8.3. Support and Sustain the Mission and Forces. “Support” directly assists, maintains,
supplies, and distributes forces at the operating location to achieve the mission and
maintain the operation of its infrastructure. “Sustain” maintains effective capacities of
mission support for the duration of operations worldwide and distributes materiel when
the executive agent role falls to Air Force.
8.3.1. Assist mission, forces, and infrastructure. Assure operation of the operating
location as a platform for mission elements. (control flightline and airspace traffic,
billet forces, medically treat forces, enhance human performance, pay forces, feed
forces, minister to forces, administer UCMJ, PERSCO, contract management,
agreements, etc.)
8.3.2. Maintain support of mission, forces, and infrastructure. Assure operating
capability through repair and preservation of equipment, vehicles, runways,
taxiways, ramps, roads and building sites, utility, communications, and fuels
grids, facilities, and other infrastructure used in support of mission.
8.3.3. Supply support for mission, forces, and infrastructure. Receive, store, and issue all
commodities needed to service and maintain the mission equipment, munitions,
support equipment, vehicles, facilities and infrastructure, personnel, medical,
service and administrative functions, and communications.
8.3.4. Distribution support for mission, forces, and infrastructure. Transport and deliver
personnel, equipment, and commodities to user in processes of mission and
support operations. Maintain effective capacities of mission support for the
duration of operations worldwide. Reachback repair and resupply Major End
Items and components. Provide purchasing and Supply Chain Management, Air
Force Specialty (AFS) Functional Management, strategic and operational levels of
distribution (in those instances where executive agent role falls to Air Force) and
create and maintain Total Asset Visibility.
8.4. Posture Responsive Forces. Define, present, apportion, and process force capabilities,
including execution of agreements and prepositioning strategy, to maximize
responsiveness and speed of employment.
8.4.1. Define force capabilities. Define common operating and support pictures for
global, theater, and operating location current and future operating environments.
8.4.2. Structure force capabilities. Organize and right-size forces to create specified
effects as required by the combatant commander. (e.g. UTCs and force modules
such as Open the Base, Establish the Base, etc.)
8.4.3. Apportion force capabilities. Assess and allocate force capabilities needed to meet
the National Security Strategy objectives of the regional combatant commanders.
8.4.4. Process force capabilities. Form, load, move, receive, and account for the
personnel, materiel, and equipment that constitute a capability.
8.4.5. Execute Support Arrangements. Negotiate and put in place interservice, coalition,
and/or contract arrangements to assure responsive support.
8.4.6. Execute Prepositioning Strategy. Assess, plan, and place prescribed levels of
resources and capabilities at strategic locations to meet required National Security
Strategy objectives.
Create the Force. Organize, train, and equip the combat and support capabilities of the Total
Force to meet global combatant commander requirements. Maintain sufficient capacities of
created forces.
9.1.
Organize Forces
9.1.1. Model, simulate, test, evaluate, and assess responsive forces.

B-7

9.2.

9.3.

9.4.

9.5.

9.1.2. Simulate force capabilities to ensure they are fully integrated into training,
wargames, experiments, exercises, and operations
9.1.3. Define requirements for and establish responsive forces
9.1.4. Define requirements for and establish responsive organizations capable of
integration with operations, joint, coalition and inter-agency organizations
Train. Prepare mission-ready graduates capable of providing the best available
specialized expertise to the combatant commander
9.2.1. Conduct Flying Training
9.2.2. Conduct Technical Training
Educate. Develop airmen, over the span of their career, by integrating enduring
leadership competencies and analytical skills
9.3.1. Provide Accessions Education
9.3.2. Provide Professional Military Education
9.3.3. Provide Specialized/Professional Continuing Education
9.3.4. Provide Degree Granting Educational Programs
9.3.5. Provide Citizenship Education
9.3.6. Provide Research and Consultation Programs
Equip
9.4.1. Design, develop, acquire, and modernize force elements; includes equipment,
systems and personnel
9.4.2. Ensure and maintain, through a combination USAF/DOD agencies, industry and
academia, a viable industrial base capable of research, testing, manufacturing,
dismantlement, and remanufacturing to produce, sustain and modernize forces
9.4.3. Assure the reliability and technological superiority of materiel, equipment, and
information
9.4.4. Assure and validate weapon system, equipment, item, materiel and IT capability
across system life cycles through operational test and evaluation of operational
availability and performance requirements
Recruit and Access. Seek, select, and enter quality people into active duty according to
Air Force mission requirements
9.5.1. Access Enlisted Personnel
9.5.2. Access Officers
9.5.3. Access Health Professions and Chaplains
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Appendix C: Linear Program Formulations

Potential systems for acquisition.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Intelligence database (x1)
Fighter heads-up display (x2)
Standoff missile (x3)
Stealthy battle damage assessment unmanned aerial vehicle (x4)
Chemical weapon detection equipment (x5)
Tankers (x6)

Linear program formulation with no risk measure included.
Maximize
(0

+0.46+0.34+0.14+0.10+0

+0.16+0.19+0.10) x1

+ (0.19+0.21+0.19+0.42+0.21+0.16+0

+0

+0.05) x2

+ (0

+0

+0

) x3

+0

+0

) x4

+0

+0

+0

+0.92+0.54+0

+ (0.26+0.12+0

+0.36+0.30+0

+0

+ (0.26+0.68+0

+0

+0.25+0.31+0.33) x5

+ (0

+0

+0

+0

+0.23+0.05+0.10+0.11+0

+0.48+0.36) x6

Subject to:
7x1+7x2+10x3+9x4+6x5+9x6 ≤ 23
All decision variables binary

Linear program formulation with undistorted expectation risk measure.
Maximize
(0

+4.7*0.46+10.2*0.34+11.8*0.14+13.3*0.10+0

+8.6*0.16+10.5*0.19+10.2*0.10) x1

+ (14.1*0.19+4.7*0.21+10.2*0.19+11.8*0.42+13.3*0.21+6.8*0.16+0

+0

+10.2*0.05) x2

+ (0

+0

+0

) x3

+0

+0

) x4

+0

+0

+0

+13.3*0.92+6.8*0.54+0

+ (14.1*0.26+4.7*0.12+0

+11.8*0.36+13.3*0.30+0

+0

+ (14.1*0.26+4.7*0.68+0

+0

+8.6*0.25+10.5*0.31+10.2*0.33) x5

+ (0

+0

+0

+0

+10.2*0.23+11.8*0.05+13.3*0.10+6.8*0.11+0

Subject to:
7x1+7x2+10x3+9x4+6x5+9x6 ≤ 23
All decision variables binary

C-1

+10.5*0.48+10.2*0.36) x6

Linear program formulation with low distortion (κ=5) expectation risk measure.
Maximize
(0

+15.2*0.46+34.3*0.34+35.5*0.14+35.9*0.10+0

+31.1*0.16+32.5*0.19+36.9*0.10) x1

+ (38.8*0.19+15.2*0.21+34.3*0.19+35.5*0.42+35.9*0.21+23.0*0.16+0

+0

+36.9*0.05) x2

+ (0

+0

+0

) x3

+0

+0

) x4

+0

+0

+0

+35.9*0.92+23.0*0.54+0

+ (38.8*0.26+15.2*0.12+0

+35.5*0.36+35.9*0.30+0

+0

+ (38.8*0.26+15.2*0.68+0

+0

+31.1*0.25+32.5*0.31+36.9*0.33) x5

+ (0

+0

+0

+0

+35.5*0.23+35.5*0.05+35.9*0.10+23.0*0.11+0

+32.5*0.48+36.9*0.36) x6

Subject to:
7x1+7x2+10x3+9x4+6x5+9x6 ≤ 23
All decision variables binary

Linear program formulation with high distortion (κ=10) expectation risk measure
Maximize
(0

+21.4*0.46+49.3*0.34+48.1*0.14+45.5*0.10+0

+46.4*0.16+43.4*0.19+55.3*0.10) x1

+ (50.0*0.19+21.4*0.21+49.3*0.19+48.1*0.42+45.5*0.21+33.1*0.16+0

+0

+55.3*0.05) x2

+ (0

+0

+0

) x3

+0

+0

) x4

+0

+0

+0

+45.5*0.92+33.1*0.54+0

+ (50.0*0.26+21.4*0.12+0

+48.1*0.36+45.5*0.30+0

+0

+ (50.0*0.26+21.4*0.68+0

+0

+46.4*0.25+43.4*0.31+55.3*0.33) x5

+ (0

+0

+0

+0

+48.1*0.23+48.1*0.05+45.5*0.10+33.1*0.11+0

Subject to:
7x1+7x2+10x3+9x4+6x5+9x6 ≤ 23
All decision variables binary
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+43.4*0.48+55.3*0.36) x6
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